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Cyprus: The Road to Partition 1950-1974

by

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Part One: Cyprus Before Independence

Introduction

Cyprus, until the mid-1950s, was a backwater of international politics, and remained there until a short and successful guerrilla war waged by Greek Cypriots for independence from British colonial rule (1954-1958). Independence was complicated when Greek and Turkish Cypriots, backed by mainland benefactors, began fighting. This internecine conflict resulted in Turkish intervention and the subsequent occupation of nearly 34% of the island by Turkish forces in July 1974.

This paper will outline Cyprus' history up to the mid-1950s and concentrate on events leading to the intervention in 1974 supporting Turkey's argument that it is solely not responsible for the tragedy that befell Cyprus. Certainly, the Turks must share the responsibility for the "Cyprus Question."

The current crisis of Cyprus has its roots in a shared Greco-Turkish memory dating back to the sixteenth century. The ancient Greeks settled Cyprus and were the main occupants until 1571 when, in conjunction with Ottoman expansion, a Turkish garrison was established. The remnants of this force were the progenitors of today's Turkish minority. As the decades passed, the Greek Cypriots increasingly identified with irredentist Greeks on the mainland. The island, under continuous Ottoman

rule until 1878, was relatively peaceful although the Greek Cypriots were a repressed majority.

In 1878, Turkish control ended with the advent of British colonial rule. Left out of the decision-making process, the Greek Cypriot majority began agitating for union with Greece, or "Enosis," as soon as the first British Governor stepped on the island. The Turkish Cypriot minority, however, only gradually began pressuring for Cyprus' return to Turkey. Considering Cyprus a strategic asset, the British policy of divide and rule virtually guaranteed the continuance of an unresolvable situation which worsened into a guerrilla war and the beginnings of civil war. Unwilling to maintain their presence in an increasingly hostile environment, Great Britain brokered a compromise solution of questionable value. British control was turned over to an elected Cypriot government and civil war broke out soon after.

The Greek Cypriot push for Enosis was fronted by Makarios, a Greek Orthodox priest, and George Grivas, a retired Greek army colonel, and had the backing of the majority of Greeks. Enosis was also openly supported by the Greek government but opposed by the Turkish government which preferred another option, partition. A military coup in Greece by ultra-conservative army officers in 1967 stepped up the pressure to unify, finally forcing Turkey's hand by overthrowing Makarios and installing a sympathetic

government in 1974. Although Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, now at the brink of war, the American and British governments initially refused to step in and control a volatile situation. Their inaction in the face of Greek interference in Cypriot affairs and the subsequent Turkish invasion five days later, led to the partitioning of Cyprus — a partition which has so far lasted nearly twenty years. Because it is a very emotional issue for all those concerned, there are very few impartial accounts available.

The historiography of modern Cyprus is rife with conflicting versions of history as each party seeks to sway world opinion and justify its stance by apportioning blame to the other actors and loudly proclaim its innocence. The long standing ethnic tensions between Greeks and Turks colors their depictions of events into a black and white world where innocence and guilt are delineated solely by nationality. In writing this paper, primary sources from Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Great Britain and the United States or their perspectives were utilized.

Early History

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, with a size of 3,572 square miles (about half the size of New Jersey). It is 140 miles long from east to west, 60 miles wide at its greatest width and

lies 40 miles south of Turkey and 500 miles southeast of mainland Greece.¹

In order to comprehend the "Cyprus Question," one must realize today's political crisis is deeply rooted in the distant past. The cultural development of Cyprus is an important factor, greatly contributing to the island's current status as a problem area. The earliest signs of civilization in Cyprus can be traced to 6,000 B.C., the Neolithic Age. Mycenean traders from mainland Greece began making an appearance around 1,400 B.C. They were followed by the Achaeans who colonized the island introducing Greek culture and language. Although archaeologists have found evidence of a mixture of other cultures mainly from Syria and Anatolia dating to the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., the Hellenistic culture of the Achaeans prevailed. According to Dr. P.N. Vanezis, "in Cyprus, from the end of the fifth century B.C. there has been a continuation of Greek culture in the ethnic sense."² It was during this period that the definite Hellenic character of the island began to emerge. Hellenic Cyprus was not Periclean Greece, but neither were other Greek territories such as Syracuse in Sicily. The overwhelming weight of archaeological evidence clearly demonstrates the predominance of Hellenic

¹ International Affairs Agency, Unknown Aspects of the Cyprus Reality, p. 7.

² Dr. P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism, p. 9.

culture in Cyprus. It is disingenuous to claim that Cyprus was and is Turkish because the island was once attached to southern Turkey while the planet's land masses were still forming.³ Turkish sources are also quick to point out that the archaeological evidence of Anatolian culture discovered on Cyprus clearly establishes the Turkishness of Cyprus. The discovery of artifacts from Anatolia should not be surprising, especially in the Mediterranean where trade among the different cities occurred on a daily basis.

The Achaeans were followed by the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians and the Persians. Cyprus was eventually annexed by the Romans in 58 B.C. where they simply confirmed the Hellenic character of the island. For the population of Cyprus, the years of Pax Romana were contented and uneventful years.

Cyprus became a province of the Eastern Roman Empire which, as Byzantium, became an essentially Greek state based on the Greek Orthodox Church and Greek language. Living in relative peace and autonomy, Cyprus prospered. The importance and influence of Byzantine rule to the development of a Greek identity in the majority of Cyprus' inhabitants should not be overlooked. The harsh treatment which the Cypriots endured at the hands of their subsequent conquerors intensified their sense of collective identity

³ International Affairs Agency, op. cit., pp. 7-10.

as Greeks. The era of relative peace and prosperity ended around the seventh century A.D. when a series of Muslim raids over the course of the years left Cyprus exhausted and impoverished. Cyprus, the first part of the Byzantine Empire to be conquered by the Crusaders, was taken by Richard I (the Lionhearted) of England in 1191 while leading the Third Crusade. Finding little use for Cyprus, he sold the island to the Knights Templars, who in turn sold it to the King of Jerusalem, Guy de Lusignan. The "Latin" rule of the de Lusignans continued the foreign rule which was to last until 1959.

The feudal monarchy founded by the House of de Lusignan ruled Cyprus until the end of the fifteenth century. During this period, all privileges belonged to the nobles, with the masses reduced to serfdom. Cypriot land was taken and distributed among the barons and knights and the Greek Orthodox Church was persecuted by the Latins.

The inhabitants of Cyprus had to contend with several more years of intolerable misrule when their island was acquired by the Venetians in 1489 prompting one Cypriot to write "we have escaped from the grasp of a dog to fall into that of the lion."⁴ It was inevitable that Venice would soon clash with the ever expanding Ottoman Empire. After

⁴ Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus, p. 21.

a long siege, Cyprus fell to the Ottomans in 1570-1571, beginning a 300 year period of Turkish administration.

Ottoman rule was at first relatively enlightened compared to the Venetian's "Latin" rule. The island was freed from the Catholic ruling class and their political system. The Turks formally abolished serfdom, the Greek Orthodox Archbishopric was restored, and the Greek population was granted limited autonomy.⁵ A policy of leniency or "istimalet" was carried out and the Cypriots were incorporated into the "millet" system. Over the years, Turkish rule in Cyprus was similar to that in other occupied territories. It was characterized by inefficiency, corruption and oppression. In spite of this, the privileged position of the Greek Orthodox Church of course grew. The Ottomans used the clergy as administrators and treated the Archbishops as "Ethnarchs," political as well as spiritual leaders of their people.⁶ There were several uprisings: in 1764, 1804, and in 1821, the latter inspired by the Greek Revolution on the mainland. This last revolt, a product of the outpouring of Greek nationalism, led to much bloodshed in reprisal on Cyprus. Among those executed were Archbishop Kyprianos (thus becoming a martyred Ethnarch) and other Greek

⁵ Costas K. Kyrris, History of Cyprus, p. 250-260.

⁶ Vanezis, op. cit., p. 16.

officials.⁷ These executions and other reprisals on the mainland propagated the idea of Turkish barbarity in the minds of Greeks everywhere, shaping attitudes which have clouded judgement till this day.

Although Cyprus was a province of the Ottoman Empire, its conquest and administration in many ways differed from those of other parts of the empire. The stationing of a large military force due to Cyprus' strategic importance in the eastern Mediterranean was significant. Cyprus had to be guarded and garrisoned, and this garrison, more than anything else, was the origin of the Turkish population of Cyprus.⁸ The numbers of Turks versus Greeks vary depending on the source utilized. Some Greek sources, by ignoring historical fact, impugn the Turkishness of Turkish Cypriots by calling them Islamicized Greeks.⁹ On the other hand, some Turkish sources use the lowest figures given for Greeks on the island arguing against the Greek character of Cyprus and not taking into consideration that the figures given may have been intentionally kept low in order to reduce taxes.¹⁰ While the Turkish population grew steadily from the original 20,000 man garrison of 1571 with the

⁷ John Koumourides, Cyprus and the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1829, pp. 56-62.

⁸ Vanezis, op. cit., p. 49.

⁹ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁰ International Affairs Agency, op. cit., p. 25.

arrival of settlers from Anatolia, the proportion of the Turkish population to the Greek population was affected by the phenomenon of Greek immigration and emigration. In 1881, the first British census showed a population of 140,000 Greeks and 45,500 Turks.¹¹

In 1878, Great Britain took over the administration of Cyprus, after it occupied the island in an agreement forced on Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Since the end of the 1820s, British policy in the eastern Mediterranean was mainly directed towards the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion.¹² The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 brought the Russian army to the gates of Istanbul forcing Great Britain to intervene with a show of naval force. By 1877, the British government had considered acquiring a base in the eastern Mediterranean against a possible Russian advance. Although several other islands such as Rhodes and Crete had been discussed, the choice fell on Cyprus whose annexation had already been considered. Under the pressure of circumstances, Turkey gave up Cyprus more or less voluntarily. The first British troops landed on 12 July 1878 followed ten days later by the philhellene High Commissioner Sir Garnet Wolseley.

¹¹ H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, pp. 186-187.

¹² Franz G. Maier, Cyprus, p. 125.

Even though Cyprus was still under nominal Turkish Sovereignty, the Greek Cypriot population, as represented by the Greek Orthodox clergy, immediately asked for Enosis, or union with Greece. The desire for Enosis was a direct result of Greek inspired irredentism. To the Greeks, the creation of the modern Greek state in 1832 was to become the basis for the emergence of a great Greek empire in its full glory¹³ — an empire which included all territories where Greeks lived, which of course included Cyprus. The Greek King was not just the King of Greece, he was the King of the Hellenes stressing his standing with Greeks everywhere. The fixed idea of a Great Greece, or the "Megali Idea," would haunt the Greeks until the disaster of 1922 in Asia Minor. The realization of the Megali Idea — the supremacy of Hellenism in the east — became the cornerstone of Greek foreign and domestic policy. With British support, Greece had already acquired Epirus and most of Thessaly at the Congress of Berlin. It was assumed that Great Britain, the great and benevolent liberal power, would help Greeks everywhere to realize their Megali Idea. This is why the High Commissioner was warmly greeted by the Cypriots. Though Enosis as a political problem is a little more than 160 years old, its roots go very far back indeed. The historic and natural claims of the Greek Cypriots

¹³ Theodore Tatsios, The Megali Idea, pp. 3-4.

center around race, ethnic origin and religion. Since races have been mixed in the Mediterranean over the course of time, the ethnic and racial arguments are of little relevance. Nationality is determined by historic and political awareness rooted in a joint culture and a common religion. According to language, culture and religion, the Orthodox Cypriots are Greek. The Greek sympathies of the majority of Cypriots quite possibly did not justify the demand for Enosis thus making the historical and legal basis for Greek Cypriot claims highly questionable. Whether the claim was legal or not, the British failure or inability over the years to fulfill this deep-rooted sentiment of Greek people must be viewed as the cause of the disillusionment which turned Enosis into an anti-British movement.

Cyprus Under the British

The agitation for Enosis began soon after the British took over the administration of the island. The Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos, formally asked the British for Enosis with Greece in his welcoming address to Sir Wolseley in July 1878. Archbishop Sophrianos in turn expressed "the wish that the island of Cyprus may enjoy the fruits of a true civilization and a just rule...We hope, therefore, that from now on a new life begins for the people of Cyprus; a new great period which will become memorable

in the annals of the island. We hope that all shall be instructed without distinction of race or creed, that the law is king of all; that all shall have equal rights and equal responsibility before the law, for quality of rights implies also equality of responsibility; that all shall be used to treading the good road, that is to say, the road of truth, of duty and of liberty."¹⁴ Of course, no mention was made of a time table or the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Turkish Cypriot community leaders wasted no time in voicing their objections to Enosis. They correctly pointed out that Cyprus still belonged to Turkey and that it had never been part of Greece. Cyprus' unification with Greece was, from the beginning, unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵

British Prime minister Disraeli looked upon Britain's new Mediterranean possession as a "key to Western Asia,"¹⁶ a sentiment publicly endorsed by Queen Victoria. Britain felt strongly about Cyprus' importance vis-à-vis the Middle East even though the island had been upstaged by Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 which offered her better naval facilities from which to protect the Suez Canal and dominate the Middle East. Though sympathetic

¹⁴ Vanezis, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵ Rauf Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, p. 19.

¹⁶ John Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus, p. 9.

towards the Greeks, Britain was not prepared to give Greece Cyprus and impair the sovereignty of the Sultan with whom Britain felt equally bound. Both the Archbishop of Cyprus and the Archbishop of Kition continued to press for Enosis, expressing the hope that Britain would give Greece Cyprus as it had the Ionian Islands in 1863.¹⁷ The Ionian Islands had been British, Cyprus was not, and the Greek intimation was met with silence. Somewhat arrogantly, several British parliamentarians felt that control over Cyprus was not only for strategic reasons but for moral reasons as well. Control over Cyprus was viewed as a way to somehow enhance Britain's ability to help reform Turkey in the way that India had been reformed under British rule.

British rule brought about fundamental change to the island, change which inevitably created the strains of disillusionment with the British, such as the levying of additional taxes which made their way to Turkey's European creditors.¹⁸ For example in 1903, 130,000 pounds sterling were raised in taxes of which 92,000 was paid to the Porte.¹⁹ The revenue raised through taxation was seen by the Greek Cypriots as monies to be expended for the benefit of the island, not to be paid to the Turks.

¹⁷ Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus Question 1950-63, p. 2.

¹⁸ Kyriakos Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, p. 6.

¹⁹ C.M.J. Orr, Cyprus Under British Rule, pp. 50-54.

In fact, the British tax policy was deeply resented. Particularly loathed was the "Tribute" paid to the Porte as a kind of yearly rental fee for the island. This amount, drawn from the revenues of Cyprus, strained the slender economic resources of the island. The colonial laws and practices were often in direct opposition to local traditions and customs. A good example of British disregard of these customs occurred in 1879, a year after the British occupation. Two priests were arrested by the authorities for cutting forest wood, an act forbidden by a newly enacted colonial law. According to evidence both scanty and unclear, they both had their heads, beards and mustaches shaven and were imprisoned as common criminals.²⁰ By antagonizing the traditional authority of the Greek Orthodox Church and curbing its power as a legitimate political institution, the British only managed to widen the gap between themselves and the Greek inhabitants of the island. They also refused to recognize the Archbishop as the Ethnarch, the political representative of the Greek Orthodox Cypriots.²¹ Although there were problems, British rule had begun promisingly. The fact that the island was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire did not prevent the Liberal and

²⁰ Markides, op. cit., p. 6.

²¹ Ibid., p. 6.

philhellene Gladstone government to endow Cyprus with a new constitution. A constitution was introduced in 1882 with a Legislative Council of eighteen. Six members were officials appointed by the High Commissioner and twelve members were elected by Cypriots (nine Greeks and three Turks in accordance with the contemporary ratio of population). By the standards of the time, this appeared to be liberal for a British possession, making the colonial administration seem constitutional and representative.²² In actuality, no real power was delegated; nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots rejoiced. The Turkish minority viewed this as majority rule, a rule they felt would ultimately become prelude to independence and Enosis with Greece.

In practice, the 1882 Constitution brought about a state of affairs diametrically opposed to the fears of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots had correctly predicted the Greek Cypriot course of action — an immediate demand for Enosis and opposition to British administration. The British frequently pointed out to the Greek Cypriots that Enosis was impossible because Cyprus was on a kind of "lease" and if they left, Cyprus would revert to Ottoman Turkish control whose sovereignty was not impaired. The Turkish Cypriot members of the council, together with the appointed members and High Commissioner, formed a permanent

²² Reddaway, op. cit., p. 19.

majority which deprived the Greek Cypriots of the power to exercise any influence over their affairs. This put the Greek Cypriots into permanent opposition with the British and, in turn, made the British entirely dependent on Turkish Cypriot votes. Thus, during the constitutional period of British Cyprus the island was ruled by an Anglo-Turkish Cypriot coalition in opposition to the Greek Cypriot majority. The innovation caused more frustration and "gridlock" in local Cypriot administration, forcing Green Cypriots to seek refuge in ever-growing Hellenistic nationalism, the logical culmination of which had to be Enosis. British policy concerning Cyprus was at best contradictory. While not strongly discouraging Enosis, they encouraged Greek Cypriot aspirations while politically keeping them at arm's length. Many British Members of Parliament were philhellenes and openly sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot cause. On the other hand, Joseph Chamberlain, in 1899, as Colonial Secretary expressed the following point of view: "The honorable gentleman opposite suggested that the island (Cyprus) should be handed over to the Greeks; I have no doubt that in some respects that would appeal to the sentiments of the Grecian population of the island; but I have no reason to believe that the Mohammedans in the island, who are equally worthy of our goodwill and care, would at all like any such

transfer."²³ Nevertheless, hopes for Enosis with Greece had been nursed from the beginning of the British occupation. Up until World War I, the clamor for Enosis, though impossible to ignore, had been relatively subdued and disciplined. It was a period of frustrated hopes in which the political climate deteriorated. Tensions in the region made it appear unlikely that Britain would ever loosen its hold. The movement for Enosis did not amount to more than inflammatory speeches in the Legislative Council, press campaigns and memoranda to London. On the other hand, the determined opposition to Enosis of the British government had the full support of the Turkish Cypriots.

Cyprus in World War I

Great Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus in 1914 when Turkey joined the Triple Alliance. Following its annexation, Cyprus became one of His Majesty's Dominions. In 1915, the Western Allies desperately needed to prop up their position in the Balkans by saving Serbia and capturing Istanbul as a means of opening communications with Russia. The Allies needed the assistance of Greece which had a pro-German monarchy. Britain offered much to the Greeks to join the Allies in defending Serbia against Bulgaria and to assist British naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. In particular, Britain needed the

²³ Maier, op. cit., p. 129.

Greek island of Cephalonia in the Ionian Sea to facilitate her naval operations in the area. The Greeks in turn asked for support over the issue of the port of Thessaloniki and the Aegean Islands. Although the islands concerned were inhabited primarily by Greeks, the request proved to be difficult as the islands were owned by Italy. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, convinced Prime Minister Lloyd George to offer Cyprus instead. Unfortunately for Greece, the government was ambivalent towards the European war and Greek neutrality was a hotly debated issue throughout Greece. Owing to the incredible confusion and division in Greek internal politics, the Greek government faced this dilemma by not replying to the British overtures. Since the offer of Cyprus had not been fully discussed in England, the offer of Cyprus to Greece came and went like a flash of lightning. Seeking to avoid an embarrassing situation on Cyprus, "the British Government quickly withdrew the proposal, but the fact that it had been made and passed over, and the political and psychological consequences (for the Greeks) could never be eradicated."²⁴ In Parliamentary circles, the offer of Cyprus eventually passed into oblivion.

But what of the Greek reaction? Eleftherios Venizelos, the pro-British politician, had he been Prime

²⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, op. cit., p. 2.

Minister would have certainly accepted the offer of Cyprus. But if he had been Prime Minister, the offer would have never been made; he was already committed in advance to supporting the Serbs against a Bulgarian attack. Being the most pro-Allied of the Greek political leaders, he was the only one who could not deliver Enosis. Venizelos could have easily defeated Prime Minister Zaimis' government in 1915 since he had a majority and could have forced public attention onto an issue of such importance.

Although the British were to never again make the offer, the Greeks were not willing to offend British sensibilities and never really pressed the matter at the time. The Greeks did make demands at the victory table as they had entered the war on the Allied side in 1917. They asked for northern Epirus (southern Albania). The Greeks also secretly hoped for a generous British concession concerning Cyprus.²⁵ Venizelos, by then Prime Minister of Greece, received verbal assurances from the British that Cyprus would be discussed in due course. A Greek Cypriot delegation, believing the talk of self-determination for all people, even travelled to London in 1919 in an attempt to gain Enosis under the Treaty of Versailles but were turned away. The period following World War I represented the high-water mark of the Megali Idea as a Greek national

²⁵ Michael L. Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 72.

goal.²⁶ The concept of a Greater Greece, as espoused by Greek nationalists, rose to unprecedented heights and what little was left of the Ottoman Empire was viewed as an obstacle to Greek ambitions in the region.

The Treaty of Sevres of August 1920 awarded Greece the whole of Thrace up to Istanbul, all the Aegean Islands excluding the Dodecanese and the Izmir region. By gaining a substantial foothold in Asia minor, the Greeks had taken a giant step towards realizing their national dream. Their dream, though, evaporated as a combination of bad luck, political irresponsibility and overconfidence combined to bring about disaster. In 1920, the popular King Alexander died, Venizelos was trounced in a national election and the crown was returned to Alexander's father, Constantine I (who was anathema to the British for his pro-German stance during the opening stages of World War I) in a plebiscite. In early 1921, the new Greek Prime Minister Dimitrios Gounaris launched an ill-advised offensive against the Turks designed to wipe out the threat of the Kemalists. Despite the early successes where the Greeks found themselves marching towards Ankara, Greece suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the rejuvenated Turkish army under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal.

²⁶ Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, p. 23.

The Treaty of Lausanne, following the cessation of hostilities, restored Izmir, eastern Thrace and two Aegean islands (Imbros and Tenedos) to the Turks. It also provided for a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. As a result, nearly 1.1 million Greeks were moved to Greece and half a million Turks were transported to Turkey.²⁷ The Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated with the aim of restoring and formulating the terms of the peace in sensitive geographical areas which had been under Turkish control. It was quite logical that the broader context should have included the status of Cyprus after it had been unilaterally annexed by Great Britain in 1914. At Lausanne, the Turks made no claims with regard to Cyprus. The issue of Cyprus, as dealt with within the framework of the Treaty of Lausanne, was not in accordance with the principles of self-determination but on the basis of short-term political expediency connected with the interests of the British. Although the existing arrangements did not allow Greece to put forth its request for the incorporation of Cyprus, Turkey renounced all rights and title to the island. The British annexation of Cyprus was formalized and accepted by all participants with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.²⁸ Although this round of the age old

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁸ Maier, op. cit., p. 131.

conflict between Greek and Turk was settled by treaty, the traumatic population exchange and the stories of the barbaric acts committed by both sides has left an indelible mark on the collective memories of both Greeks and Turks. It was during this period that the seeds of doubt over foreign involvement in Greek affairs and the paranoia of a conspiracy to wipe out Hellenism were planted. Unfortunately these seeds would grow into the feelings which in the future would affect Greek attitudes towards the Turks and the Western powers.

Cyprus as a British Colony

Cyprus became a British Crown Colony on 10 March 1925. The strategic reasons advanced to keep Cyprus were unconvincing to many Britons. Economically, Cyprus was insignificant. In spite of the massacres occurring on the mainland, Greek Cypriots had behaved well towards the Turkish Cypriots so Britain's assertion of duty to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority may be viewed as a mere excuse. "The reason Enosis was rejected was a spasm of Middle East imperialism which seized the colonial secretaries."²⁹ The composition of the government council remained the same, further frustrating the Greek Cypriots. Rather than seek a solution, the British gave the impression that by promoting impasse, they could keep

²⁹ Brian Lapping, End of Empire, p. 314.

a lid on the continuous Enosist agitation.³⁰ The Greek Cypriots found themselves facing not the Ottoman but the British Empire.

This brought about a change of style. The Enosists became more hostile as anti-British sentiment spread. In 1928, the Greek Cypriots boycotted the official celebrations marking the golden jubilee of British rule, despite the fact that they had enjoyed considerable civil liberties.³¹

Although its power had decreased, the Greek Orthodox Church was able to continually exert some influence. Agitation for Enosis was kept alive by the Church through sermons and by mainland Greek teachers introduced by the British to teach in Greek Cypriot schools.³² The Turkish Cypriots accurately claimed these individuals, along with doctors, lawyers and priests, were sent by Greece to foment nationalism among Greek Cypriots. There was hardly a school on the island whose walls were not adorned with portraits of the Greek royal family and Greek flags. If the High Commissioner approached, school children had been taught to greet him with the cry of "Long Live Union!" The fervor of Ataturk's revolution was nurtured in Turkish

³⁰ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 21.

³¹ Averoff-Tossizza, op. cit., p. 3.

³² Denktash, op. cit., p. 19.

Cypriot communities by mainland Turkish teachers as well.³³ Ataturk's ideas deeply influenced the Turkish Cypriots, especially the young who began to think of themselves not only as Muslims but as Turks. Turkish Cypriot leaders had even approached Ankara for the return of Cyprus to Turkey but learned that Turkish nationalism ended at the then Turkish Republic's borders.

At times, the British authorities treated the Turkish Cypriot minority with more harshness than it did the Greek Cypriot majority in a feeble attempt to discourage growing Turkish ethnocentrism. They banned the importation of schoolbooks from Turkey raising anti-British sentiment among the students, intelligentsia and the professional classes. Among the few thousands of Turkish Cypriots lured back to Turkey by the Turkish government with promises of land grants were many students who were forced to complete their studies elsewhere.³⁴ More importantly, the British lost the loyalty of the intelligentsia who began to seek emotional solutions rather than those of the intellect.

The British policy was one of ignorance. They allowed Greek nationalism and Enosis agitation to grow in the Greek Cypriot community while simultaneously attempting to contain Turkish nationalism while using the Turkish

³³ Michael Carver, War Since 1945, pp. 44-45.

³⁴ Oberling, op. cit., p. 53; Panteli, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

Cypriot minority to hold the Greek Cypriots in a political stranglehold. Great Britain's desire to maintain control of Cyprus by such means must be seen as the direct cause of the troubles that ensued.

With the encouragement of the Greek Consul in Nicosia, Alexis Kyrou, the face of Enosist agitation changed. Some Greek Cypriots made passionate speeches calling for civil disobedience, boycotts of British goods and non-payment of taxes. Others resigned from the Council. On 21 October 1931, Enosist agitation turned to violent insurrection when the Archbishop of Kition, who had resigned from the Council, led a march to the visible monument of British imperialism, the Government House. He openly denounced the British and called for Enosis. In Nicosia, the capital, an enthusiastic crowd gathered then grew under the exhortations of the impassioned priest. A Greek flag was unfurled and the revolution was proclaimed. Riots broke out around and near the Government House which was burned to the ground. Riots soon spread round the island. The rioters were attacked by British police and soldiers who killed seven, injured 67 and arrested 400.³⁵ It took the British three days to suppress the riots, causing the British Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, to comment that "after this, no logical person can deny that the Cypriot is Greek,

³⁵ Sabahhattin Ismail, 20 Temmuz Barış Harekatin Nedenleri, Gelişimi, Sonuçları, p. 27.

thinks as a Greek, speaks Greek and feels Greek."³⁶ The Greek Prime Minister Venizelos publicly expressed his regrets over the incident and quickly recalled the Consul who had apparently systematically disobeyed instructions from Athens by promoting such an extremist line.

The British inflicted extreme penalties on the islanders for their behavior. They suspended the Constitution, banned political parties, removed all elected representatives from the Legislative Council and introduced the Governor's absolute rule. Many of the Greek Cypriot leaders were banished from the island and others were fined, imprisoned, or forced to leave their communities. A 25,000 pound sterling fine was imposed in the form of taxes to pay for the damages. The British even made it a criminal offense to question British authority or sovereignty, to raise the Greek flag or to ring church bells. According to the Turkish Cypriots who had not participated in the riots, their rights as well were stripped because of Greek "fanaticism."³⁷

As a result, all visible manifestations of Greek and Turkish nationalism were repressed. Education was placed under government control and the teaching of Greek and Turkish history was restricted. The disturbances of 1931

³⁶ Constantine Chronaios, Kypros, To Stigma Tou Eleftherou Kosmou, p. 20.

³⁷ Denktash, op. cit., p. 20.

which had occurred under the Greek flag and the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church represented the beginning of the militant struggle for Enosis. The rigid and heavy-handed British response only served to further polarize the two communities and was, without a doubt, to blame for the worsening situation.

World War II and After

While Turkey maintained its neutrality in World War II, Greece entered the war on the Allied side. Italy had attacked Greece in 1940, but the war went all around Cyprus leaving the island untouched. The island was not militarily involved, thus confirming again its strategic insignificance. A few hundred Greek Cypriots joined the British Army in logistical and administrative roles at that time, then Greece's unexpected success against the Italians and the Germans in 1941 inspired over 30,000 Greek Cypriots to enlist.³⁸ Enosis was given a boost and for the first time since 1931 Greek flags were unfurled almost everywhere. The Germans quickly defeated the Greeks, however, forcing the Greek government and King into exile. The Greek government had asked for British permission to move to Cyprus, but was denied and moved to Cairo instead.

The Greek contribution to the Allied war effort, the spontaneous outpouring of support from Greek Cypriots and

³⁸ *Chronaios*, op. cit., p. 128.

the ambiguous but encouraging words and promises of self-determination to dependent territories raised the hopes of the Enosists. Throughout the years of World War II and the subsequent Greek Civil War (1946-1949), the Greek government continued to raise the issue of Enosis by mentioning "Cyprus as among the daughters of Greece that would be reunited with the motherland after the victory."³⁹

The political life of Cyprus was revived in other ways during the war years. The British had promised to restore democratic institutions, beginning with local government elections. The elections were held in 1943 and the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) won control of Famagusta and Limassol. Previously, Cypriot politics had been dominated by the clergy and a small elite of professional men inspired by the idea of Enosis and Greek national revival. AKEL and the trade unions were more concerned with conditions of life and work in Cyprus — a problem for the British but certainly a change from the demand for Enosis. This marked the emergence of opposition to Enosis.

During the 1940s, the Turkish Cypriots, taking a more active role in affairs which affected them, raised their voices in complaint against the British colonial

³⁹ Lapping, op. cit., p. 315.

administration and the increasing harassment from Greek Cypriots. During this period, several popular leaders emerged. One of the most distinguished was the French trained physician Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, the son of a farmer, who became a founder of the association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus or KATAK in 1943.⁴⁰ The purpose of this party was to promote the political, economic and social interests of the Turkish Cypriot community. In 1944, he resigned from the party and formed the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party. Rauf Denktash, a British trained lawyer who was involved in Turkish Cypriot affairs, became Dr. Kuchuk's chief aide and heir apparent.

Immediately after World War II, there were several developments preventing Enosis. Greece, weakened by the brutal four year Axis occupation which left much of the country's infrastructure in ruins and with the ensuing civil war, was even more dependent on Great Britain and the United States. The advent of the Cold War made a strong and satisfied Turkey more important to the West as a key force facing the Soviet Union on what was to become NATO's southeastern flank. More importantly, there was the continued opposition of the Turkish Cypriots to Enosis.

⁴⁰ Shukru Gurel, Kibris Tarihi, 1878-1960, Vol. II, p. 22.

Despite this, the newly elected Labor Government of Clement Attlee allowed the exiled leaders from 1931 to return to Cyprus, where they wasted no time in resuming their militant Enosist activities. Concurrently, the Labor Government had announced that it would call for a consultative assembly in Cyprus to discuss constitutional reforms and create a ten-year economic development plan. Under the circumstances, this was as "liberal" a package as Britain could be expected to offer except that it excluded self-determination and, therefore, the possibility of Enosis.⁴¹

The Greek Cypriots were not united in their efforts. There was so much dissension amongst the Greek Cypriots that the British attempt to convene the Consultative Assembly in late 1947 met with failure the following year. The Ethnarchy was uncompromising and would not discuss any plan for Cyprus which did not include Cyprus' liberty by Enosis. It ordered that the meeting be boycotted. The Assembly was convened and was attended only by AKEL members and Turkish Cypriot representatives. The AKEL representatives pressed for "responsible" government while the British offered Constitutional Legislature of twenty-two elected members, four Turkish Cypriots, four official members — giving the Greek Cypriots a majority. Wide

⁴¹ Lapping, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

reserved powers were to be left to the Governor and his Executive Council. Again, Great Britain, in persisting on keeping Cyprus and by refusing to discuss the island's status within the Commonwealth, turned the majority of the population against them. While the Turkish representatives accepted the proposals, the Greek Cypriot AKEL members, who realized the majority were in favor of Enosis, joined the Ethnarchy in its call for Enosis and walked out of the meetings.

It is significant to note that a great opportunity had been lost when the conferences were abandoned in 1948. The British, having removed their troops from Palestine in 1948 and with their facilities in Egypt under constant attack, were faced with the prospect of having no bases located in the Middle East from which to protect their vital oil interests. In the minds of the strategic planners, Cyprus had again become important. Britain, not wanting its sovereignty over the island questioned, offered the Greek Cypriots an absolute majority in the legislature with the proposal. Although the majority could have easily been overruled by the Governor, it was an improvement over the constitution that had ruled Cyprus from 1882 to 1931. Had the Greek Cypriots accepted this proposal rather than ruling out anything but Enosis, they could have formed the basis for further constitutional advancement. The Cypriots were left without representation in government and the few

Cypriots who were invited into the advisory council had no formal role and no public support. The Greek Cypriot rejection of the British offer should not have been surprising. Although there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the British in offering some type of reform, it may be seen as eyewash. Great Britain had been forced to relinquish India and was under increasing pressure in Palestine and in Cyprus to withdraw. In Cyprus, the yearning for independence leading to union with Greece intensified after World War II. Makarios II, the Archbishop of Cyprus, an ardent supporter of Enosis, had clearly stated the Greek Cypriot position to the British by refusing to cooperate. The British Governor had become a reluctant autocrat and the situation, though not yet dangerous, had become awkward. "Cyprus remained on the surface a quiet, beautiful island, betraying no sign that it was ready to explode before the world like a bomb."⁴²

The Plebiscite of 1950

1950 saw the emergence of the eminent Cypriot leader, Makarios III (1913-1977). Born in humble circumstances in the Troodos Mountain village of Pano Panaghia, he was elected Bishop of Kition in 1948 and Archbishop of Cyprus

⁴² Lapping, op. cit., p. 316.

in 1950.⁴³ Welcomed by Greek Cypriots as an ardent supporter of Enosis, he was feared by the Turkish Cypriots for exactly the same reason. The Turkish Cypriots accused him of "causing much strife and bloodshed, inter-communal as well as inter-Greek, until his death."⁴⁴ His pledge for Enosis became known as the "Holy Pledge." Partially responsible for the rejection of the 1948 British proposal, he first came to British attention when he helped organize an island-wide plebiscite to reinforce the demand for Enosis. The result, based on Ethnarchy Council figures, was an overwhelming 95.7% in favor of Enosis.⁴⁵ It must be taken into consideration that all the ballot boxes were placed in Greek Orthodox churches where, after the usual Sunday service, the parishioners were encouraged to vote under the watchful eyes of the priests. The referendum was so successful that the Ethnarchy wanted to internationalize the issue of Enosis, fully understanding the discomfort it caused the Turkish Cypriots.⁴⁶ The results were sent to the Greek, British and United States governments and to various delegations at the United Nations. Having lived in the United States for two years, Makarios realized that

⁴³ Oberling, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

⁴⁴ Denktash, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁵ Mithat Gurata, Turkler, Rumlar ve Kibris, p. 69.

⁴⁶ Ismail, op. cit., p. 29.

rich Greeks living there could become important backers for Enosis. His position as Archbishop gave him standing in Greece where he doubled his efforts to enlist the Greek government to the cause of Enosis. Makarios took his campaign to Athens where he was warmly received by a Greek public still excited by the idea of uniting all overseas Greeks with the motherland. The Greek government, sensitive to British sensibilities and dependent on their material support, seeking to please its ally and avoid trouble with the voters, publicly endorsed a United Nations solution. Makarios, unlike his predecessors, had travelled and lived abroad. While abroad, he gained a degree of sophistication and understanding of politics which aided his career. Makarios brought a dynamic style of leadership and drive to the Ethnarchy and soon proved that the Ethnarchy could utilize new methods as well to achieve Enosis.

Grivas and EOKA

The other prominent figure in the Greek Cypriot struggle for Enosis was the Cyprus born former Greek Army lieutenant colonel George Grivas. He had been an officer with an unsavory reputation for committing atrocities during the German occupation of Greece during the World War. He formed a resistance organization called "CHI" (the Greek letter for "X") which, instead of concentrating

on fighting the Germans, sought to pave the way for the return of the Greek monarchy from exile by killing Communists and others who opposed the monarchy's return.⁴⁷ Grivas had been retired from the army in 1945 because of his activities during the war. When he tried to enter the political arena as a candidate for parliament, he was viewed as a political liability for his extremism by those he sought to represent, and he was rejected.⁴⁸ Disillusioned and out of work, Grivas began to study the tactics and organization utilized by the Communists during World War II and the Greek Civil War. While living in Athens he came into contact with a group of Greek Cypriots living in exile and irredentist Greeks who were contemplating a campaign of violence on Cyprus to achieve Enosis. The plotters were split into two groups — those who wanted passive resistance and sabotage and those who supported a campaign of terrorism. Grivas, known for his earlier activities, was asked which of the two he favored. Grivas favored both, one after the other.⁴⁹

In 1951, Makarios, uncertain how to go about forcing Enosis, entered the scene and became actively involved with the plotters, inviting Grivas to join their group. Grivas

⁴⁷ Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History, Vol. II, p. 890.

⁴⁸ Dudley Barker, Grivas, Portrait of a Terrorist, pp. 45-48.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 57.

travelled to Cyprus that same year, assessed the situation and enthusiastically drew up a plan of violence for the Enosis campaign.⁵⁰ In 1952, Makarios, chairing a meeting in Athens of the "revolutionary council," sent Grivas back to Cyprus in order to recruit members for the movement and arrange for the shipment of arms. Makarios and most members of what was soon to become EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) envisioned a small scale campaign for Enosis; Grivas had greater plans — an island wide movement of resistance and revolt aimed at expelling the British. Whether Makarios, a priest, can be held personally responsible for the full scale terrorist campaign which developed is debatable. He and Grivas, from the beginning, were mistrustful of each other and did not see eye to eye on how to conduct this "campaign." Grivas believed that a military solution would convince Greece to publicly take on the cause of Enosis in an international forum. Makarios, however, was convinced that few Greek Cypriots were sufficiently enthusiastic to take any action, feeling that it would be unwise to disturb the benign British rule which allowed them to prosper.

The Turkish Cypriots, with some support from Ankara, were not idle and they too began to stir up public opinion. The Turkish Cypriots demonstrated their opposition to

⁵⁰ Carver, op. cit., p. 45.

Enosis while favoring the Turkish position of restoration of the island to Turkey in the event of a change of the status quo. Because of this, they were considered by many Greek Cypriots to be the "national and religious enemy."⁵¹ Thus, in this climate of inter-communal tension, EOKA was formed on 2 July 1952.⁵² As nationalistic fervor among the Greek Cypriots had increased, so had the sense of isolation felt by the Turkish Cypriot minority. The growth of Turkish nationalism was a direct result of the outpouring of Enosist sentiment. Increased harassment of Turkish Cypriots led to the creation of a para-military militia named "Volkan" (Volcano) in 1954, a group Ankara refused to support out of fear of disturbing the British.⁵³

Also during this period, the concept of "Taksim" or partition emerged. The desire for self-determination, as expressed by Taksim, was the result of the Turkish Cypriots' needs to ensure their physical and cultural survival in the face of growing Greek Enosist agitation, whether it be as an independent state or as a part of Turkey.⁵⁴ In later years this would be called "double Enosis" and for many Greeks became the evidence needed

⁵¹ Denktash, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵² Ismail, op. cit., p. 32.

⁵³ Oberling, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁴ Sabahhattin Ismail, 100 Soruda, Kibris Sorunu, p. 48.

to show that Turkey prior to 1974 had always intended to invade Cyprus and occupy the northern part of the island.

Makarios, while uneasy of Grivas' schemes, continued to provide Greek Orthodox Church funds to pay for the arms, equipment and explosives needed. Skepticism from within EOKA, a severe lack of military training and the lack of equipment delayed operations for three years. Grivas was having problems smuggling large quantities of weapons on to the island through the British lines of communications.⁵⁵ The delay in operations did not stop Makarios from making the speeches that excited the Greek voters, turning the issue of Cyprus into a national obsession. The Greek government, realizing that the effect Makarios was having on the Greek public was potentially disastrous and that Greece might be held responsible by Britain for Grivas' acts, decided to take on the issue of Enosis. Greece discouraged Makarios from going to the United Nations in an attempt to promote its own view on Enosis and to avoid the inevitable anti-British sentiment a struggle for Enosis would cause by encouraging bilateral Greek-British talks. What eventually drove the Greek government to actively support Enosis was the attitude towards Cyprus of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and some of his colleagues in the British government. From this point on, Greece no

⁵⁵ Asprey, op. cit., p. 891.

longer looked on Britain as a good friend. Its government severed its ties with Britain in certain areas such as military cooperation.

Eden was convalescing in Greece after an operation in September 1953 when he met informally with the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos. Papagos, intending to determine the British intentions on Cyprus, broached the subject even suggesting the sovereign British bases could remain in Cyprus regardless of the outcome. Eden, in an outburst of anger, retorted that he would "never" discuss the "Cyprus Question" which angered the Greek Prime Minister.⁵⁶ Papagos was later invited to London by Eden and asked that Cyprus be included in the talks. When the British Foreign Secretary refused, Papagos cancelled his trip. Greece at this point was relatively stable and now felt it could speak with Britain on issues of national importance on an equal basis. After all, Greece had been an ally during the war and one of the first battlefields of the Cold War. Many Greeks felt that the "award" of Cyprus should have been made, so the support for Enosis increased and now had official backing.⁵⁷ A second and far more devastating "never" followed in July 1954 which

⁵⁶ Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, pp. 36-37.

⁵⁷ Panteli, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

strengthened the Greek perception of Britain as a bad friend.

An announcement had been made in the House of Commons by a junior minister of the Colonial Office proclaiming that a new constitution for Cyprus would be introduced. Prior to the statement, Eden had reluctantly announced that British forces in the Suez were to be withdrawn, bowing to the extreme pressure of an Egyptian bombing and sniping campaign. In order to quell a potential revolt by a group of Conservative Members of Parliament, Cyprus was selected to be the new Middle East headquarters for the British — and there certainly were not going to be any more withdrawals. Britain did not want to alienate Turkey, by now an important NATO ally, by abandoning the Turkish Cypriot minority. The British worsened the situation by stating that Cyprus would never be given to Greece which was unstable, though friendly.⁵⁸ The new constitutional arrangements announced in 1954 offered Cypriots an assembly with a majority of officials and nominated members, even less than the terms of 1948. As before, the issue of self-determination was avoided and British sovereignty was to continue. The Greeks decided in 1954 to seek a debate on Cyprus in the United Nations. After the Greek move, the British perception of Greece as an unreliable and bad

⁵⁸ Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus, A Reluctant Republic, p. 41.

friend arose. Cyprus had grown from a colonial problem into an international issue. Later that year, the United Nations included Cyprus on its agenda. Cyprus was discussed in the General Assembly but no resolution was passed. Given that Britain had relinquished India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Palestine, Britain's obsession with a relatively insignificant Cyprus is puzzling. It is understandable that most British politicians would be distressed with Great Britain's rapid imperial decline. Following Britain's international embarrassment over the loss of other colonial possessions, she may have fixated on Cyprus because it was a seemingly winnable proposition.

The Governor, Robert Armitage, attempted to make some progress in the constitutional process but was met with resistance from Makarios and other leading Greek Cypriots who insisted on Enosis or nothing. He then turned to the moderates from whom he learned that many Cypriots were apathetic towards Enosis and might agree to a solution not based on union with Greece. Makarios had been correct in assuming that many Cypriots would not fight for Enosis. Armitage may have very well made progress towards a solution if Eden and the British had not pushed the Greek government to a policy of open opposition. Makarios should have been more astute in his dealings. Instead, time and again Makarios' actions were bull-headed. He rejected many proposals which would have established limited autonomy —

unfortunately he stuck by his proposition of all or nothing. Makarios in some aspects did not read the political situation clearly; he missed the opportunities presented him. At this early stage, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was still unformed. Had Makarios been less obstinate and more far sighted, Greek control of Cyprus would have very possibly become a reality. Armitage of course did not know of Grivas, let alone Makarios' involvement in assisting Grivas, or of the Greek government's new policy which allowed him to collect arms in Athens.⁵⁹ Grivas, who had recruited his fighters and trained them to follow his instructions literally to the letter, established his headquarters in a suburb of Nicosia and was prepared to go to war. The stage was set for violence.

The Armed Struggle

EOKA had originally planned to start its campaign of violence on 25 March 1955, Greek Independence Day.⁶⁰ Makarios had prepared the Cypriots for the struggle in a series of inflammatory sermons designed to arouse public sentiment into accepting nothing less than Enosis. Correctly predicting heightened security for the 25th, Grivas, now calling himself Dighenis after a Byzantine

⁵⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

⁶⁰ Carver, op. cit., p. 47.

hero, started his operations the evening of 31 March/1 April 1955. The attacks came in the form of several bombs which exploded soon after midnight, damaging a Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation radio station, some army barracks and several administration buildings. Over the next few months, other facilities such as police stations were attacked with varying success, intimidating the police into inaction.⁶¹ A well publicized attempt on Armitage's life failed.

Eden, who was now Prime Minister replacing Winston Churchill, responded to the attacks by inviting the Greeks and Turks to London for discussions. In so doing, Eden sought to forestall another Greek move in the United Nations by a show of positive effort to finding a solution. As the Greeks learned, the Turks had been brought into the discussions to demonstrate to the world the intense interest in Cyprus of the Turkish decision makers, something the Greeks had refused to reckon with. There was no question in Greek government circles as to the Turkish attitudes towards Cyprus; they had chosen to give this factor little weight and viewed the "Question" based on legal terms. To the Greeks, Turkey, in accepting the Treaty of Lausanne, had recognized Britain's annexation of Cyprus, therefore relinquishing its claim to the island.

⁶¹ Michael Dewar, The Brush Fire Wars, pp. 69-70.

The Greek government chose to ignore signs of Turkish resentment at being excluded from any discussion over Cyprus and Turkish statements vocalizing their desire that no change be made on the island.

Eden's attempt to publicize Turkey's opposition to Enosis to the United Nations and the rest of the world was successful. Indeed, Turkey's opposition was expressed with more vigor than anticipated in the form of massive anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir which broke out on the closing day of the London Conference. Turks roughed up thousands of Greeks, looted over 2,500 stores and destroyed dozens of churches.⁶² This event stimulated a new perception of Turkey's interest in Cyprus and had an intimidating effect on the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. With one express goal being the exclusion of the Turks from the decision making process, they lowered the level of their demands on the British by expressing the desire to discuss self-determination with British assurances in the future.

Meanwhile it became apparent that the British were slowly losing control over the island. The EOKA campaign continued as many more Greek Cypriots, fearful for their lives if they did not support EOKA, joined the organization. Bombs were placed and detonated in various British facilities killing and wounding scores of British

⁶² Chronaios, op. cit., p. 13.

soldiers. Greek Cypriot customs officials helped EOKA smuggle the weapons they needed as the police leaked anti-terrorist plans to them. In order to counter the ever growing threat, the British brought in additional troops, bringing the total to 12,000, later followed by another 5,000.⁶³ They also appointed as Governor Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, an experienced soldier who had served in similar situations throughout the vast but shrinking empire. An immediate result of his appointment was that in October 1955, Makarios and Harding met and began negotiations, not as friends but as competitors, if not foes. The talks, which lasted five months, were another missed opportunity to solve the "Cyprus Question." Harding was able to get through to Makarios with whom he established a working relationship based on mutual trust and respect. Had it not been for the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the intransigence of some supporters of Enosis, an equitable settlement might have been reached.

Harding brought a development plan for Cyprus based on an injection of 38 million pounds into the economy, and a plan to introduce limited self-government, with the possibility of self-determination at some future date.⁶⁴

⁶³ Carver, op. cit., p. 52.

⁶⁴ Vanezis, op. cit., p. 88.

Harding, aware of the influence Makarios had among Greek Cypriots, wanted him to denounce EOKA's use of violence. The British realized that Makarios would not back down. As long as their policy on Cyprus was "never," Makarios would continue agitating. The statement of British policy was delivered to Makarios in early 1956: "Her Majesty's Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations...to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the eastern Mediterranean...If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus, be consistent with the strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies...Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the Community."⁶⁵

Having failed to recognize the significant shift in British policy, Makarios decided to break off the

⁶⁵ Vanezis, *ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

negotiations in the hope that he could secure a better deal by pushing the price a little higher. The new Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Caramanlis, saw the opportunity and persuaded Makarios to resume talks. Makarios agreed and tried to secure a British guarantee that the period of self-government would be followed by self-determination, again the ultimate goal being Enosis. Harding replied by stating that the will of the majority in the elected assembly would be hard to ignore.⁶⁶ Upon consulting the Ethnarchy, Makarios agreed to a settlement. He then consulted Grivas whom he arranged to meet in the mountains. Somewhat convinced, Grivas agreed to cease fighting if two conditions were met. He asked for a complete amnesty for members of EOKA and that the police be taken from under British control before independence. Harding began to tire of Makarios' Levantine negotiating methods. It seemed as if whenever the British government made a concession, Makarios would up the ante. As the months of negotiations went by, Harding began to suspect Makarios of working with EOKA whose operations increased whenever the talks broke down. That a religious and political leader would be involved in violent activities was unthinkable to many. That a Greek Orthodox priest was involved in a struggle for independence should not have been a surprise. In fact, it

⁶⁶ Lapping, op. cit., p. 327.

shows a profound misunderstanding of the role of a priest in Greek society. During the Greek War for Independence, priests were leading figures in the struggle against the Ottomans and, if need be, took up arms against the enemy of Hellenism. Makarios detested violence. However, as Ethnarch, there was no reason to think he would act differently in endorsing militant action in order to impress upon the British the seriousness with which the Greek Cypriots viewed their struggle.

The British agreed in principle to Makarios' requests. A constitution through which the Greek Cypriots were to have the majority vote was offered. They also agreed to pass control of the police to the Greek Cypriots, albeit with some reservations. Put simply, the idea of a Greek Cypriot police running unchecked on the island was not a comforting one. Amnesty was offered for all except those who had been convicted for violence against people or for carrying arms. The concessions were based on the idea that all violence on the island would cease. Realistically, the British had moved as far as they could to meet the Greek Cypriot demands. Makarios demanded self-determination and the negotiations collapsed in February. The breakdown of the negotiations must be viewed as a disaster for the Cypriots and the British. Makarios did not accept compromise when he could have. Acceptance at this stage of the British offer may have allowed some constitutional

advancement on which more progress could have been made. The Greek Cypriots may have been able to enjoy self-determination much sooner. On the other hand, Makarios, intensely aware of AKEL's growing popularity as evidenced by their election victories in two key Cypriot cities, may have had doubts about the outcome of a vote for Enosis in an elected assembly. By insisting on Enosis and nothing else, he was able to maintain political control of Cyprus while appearing to look out for the best interests of the islanders. Although the British had shown the willingness to negotiate and compromise, they were not blameless either. The Conservatives in government were not pleased as Great Britain was slowly being forced out of the Middle East and were anxious to show some old style imperial muscle. Great Britain was not willing to give up Cyprus easily.

The next step towards disaster came a few days later. Citing the large volume of evidence gathered on Makarios' surreptitious encouragement of EOKA in order to improve his bargaining position, the British decided to deport Makarios on 6 March 1956 to the remote Indian Ocean group of islands, the Seychelles.⁶⁷ Makarios' deportation was severely criticized as both unjustified and unwise. Unjustified? Probably not. Makarios was clearly involved

⁶⁷ Reddaway, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

from the beginning in EOKA's activities. But the deportation was unwise for a couple of reasons. The majority of Greek Cypriots were not aware of Makarios' connection with Grivas and EOKA and the detainment of a religious leader without trial was seen as the act of a totalitarian government. The banishment of the Ethnarch was a serious political miscalculation. The Greek government, which had discretely directed Makarios to a compromise, was now under pressure by the Greek public to back EOKA.⁶⁸ The banishment only served to further alienate the British from the majority of the population who still saw Makarios as the Ethnarch and true representative of the Greek Cypriot people. More importantly, Makarios' departure left Grivas in control of the situation politically and militarily. Harding, who felt unrestrained by the need to negotiate and had recently learned who "Dighenis" was, was determined to eliminate Grivas and EOKA.

Grivas had taken advantage of the long cease-fire to further prepare EOKA for its Enosist struggle. He recruited heavily in the high schools and did not hesitate in utilizing young men and women or even children to assist EOKA in its operations.⁶⁹ The campaign of terror which

⁶⁸ Constantine E. Nouska, Ena Ifaistio Stin Mesogio, pp. 52-53.

⁶⁹ Asprey, op. cit., p. 894.

ensued not only targeted British servicemen but British servicemen's family members were killed in the streets as were Greek Cypriots who were labelled as traitors for not collaborating with EOKA. The Turkish Cypriots who were in a vulnerable position as a result of their anti-Enosis stand soon became a target for EOKA activities as well. Nearly one hundred were killed over the next few years.⁷⁰ Grivas' campaign was designed with the hope that Britain would restore order by repression thus increasing the anti-British feeling amongst the Greek Cypriot population. Governor Harding turned the entire government into an instrument of security with which to combat EOKA. The police, which had been made up primarily of Greek Cypriots, was reorganized. Many of the policemen were deemed untrustworthy as they were considered working for EOKA by passing information to the organization. They were replaced by Turkish Cypriots who were trained and armed to perform security operations adding to the already strained inter-communal relations. This of course spurred the allegations of British partisanship toward the Turkish Cypriots and their support for Turkish partition. Greek Cypriots claimed that police weapons ended up in the hands of the Turkish Resistance Organization or TMT, the armed wing of Volkan.⁷¹ The reorganization of the police should

⁷⁰ Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute, p. 4.

⁷¹ Reddaway, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

not be viewed as politically motivated — it was a practical solution which met the manpower requirements arising from the newly declared State of Emergency.

Although the British soldiers had been warned to act properly, more often than not security sweeps turned ugly. Soldiers who had seen their comrades killed by bombs and snipers, cold bloodedly murdered in the streets, tended not to be sensitive or careful while searching Greek Cypriots and their houses. The Greek Cypriots gained a propaganda victory and the cause for Enosis was given an international boost as the world was treated to photographs and stories of British soldiers detaining children and young women at gunpoint. As the State of Emergency was declared, the harsh methods of a totalitarian state not a democracy were introduced. The death penalty for violence against people, life imprisonment for the possession of weapons, collective punishment, whippings, deportation and censorship were applied to those found guilty.

The guerrilla war in Cyprus was certainly not the first encounter the British had with an indigenous movement for independence. Up until 1954, they had faced similar movements in Palestine, Kenya and Malaya with varying success. What is surprising is the apparent failure to comprehend that the war on Cyprus was conducted with a political agenda — Enosis — not a military goal. Although Enosis was unacceptable to the British at that time, there

was no one in a position of power in Britain who could grasp the futility of the senseless violence in Cyprus and that a 1959-style settlement could have been achieved earlier.

The intensive searches forced EOKA to leave the relative comfort of the cities for the mountains in order to seek respite. Grivas was nearly caught when a patrol of British paratroopers sweeping through a Paphos mountain forest came upon his hiding place. He narrowly escaped capture but left his glasses, diary, binoculars and other belongings behind (items which are still on display in a British museum).⁷² Although the British failed to apprehend Grivas, his fighters were not accustomed to operating without his detailed orders and were stymied by the British security forces who captured several fighters and supporters.

The deportation of Makarios also marked the beginning of a British campaign in the Middle East to secure their interests in the region. Events in Cyprus were overshadowed in the summer by Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser who had nationalized the Suez Canal. The British and the French found this unacceptable and the slight to imperial prestige was met by a military operation in the fall. This had an immediate and long term impact on Cyprus as well.

⁷² Dewar, op. cit., p. 75.

Harding lost the initiative when many of the British soldiers who were involved in security operations were withdrawn from Cyprus in order to participate in Operation Musketeer, the Anglo-French landing at Suez. As a result, EOKA carried out over four hundred attacks throughout Cyprus in November alone. It became "Black November" as embarrassed British officials called it.⁷³ The long term impact was more decisive for Cyprus' future.

The United States, which had until then quietly supported the British in the Middle East and on the Cyprus issue, refused to back the British efforts in the Suez — almost bankrupting the British government. Prime Minister Eden was forced to resign as a result of this debacle. In order to meet the financial crisis, Britain was forced to reduce their defense expenditures emphasizing nuclear weapons over conventional forces. With this shift to nuclear weapons, the conventional forces were reduced in size from 700,000 to 375,000.⁷⁴ In view of such a drastic downsizing, the disproportionate deployment of some 30,000 troops employed in security operations was seen as superfluous. It also meant a change in the role of Cyprus. The island would now only be useful as an airfield for nuclear weapon equipped strategic bombers. The British

⁷³ Asprey, op. cit., p. 898.

⁷⁴ Lapping, op. cit., p. 335.

government, internationally humiliated by the "Suez Crisis" and its handling of Cyprus, began viewing Cyprus as a thorn in its side. Wishing to disengage from Cyprus preferring base rights, the island became a "strategic convenience" not a necessity. The new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was to be the architect of withdrawal.

In late 1956, the British jurist Lord Radcliffe was appointed constitutional commissioner. He prepared proposals for a liberal measure of self-government for Cyprus under British sovereignty giving the people wide control over their own affairs while at the same time safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot minority and British strategic interests. The Greek Cypriots refused to meet with him claiming that any meaningful discussions must include Makarios. Radcliffe had proposed a single chamber legislature in which the Greek Cypriots were to have a majority, a minister for Turkish Cypriot affairs, carefully devised safeguards for the Turkish minority and more importantly, self-determination for both communities. The Colonial Office appended a statement which supported partition. Secretary Lennox-Boyd wrote: "Provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination...Her Majesty's Government recognizes that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include

partition among the eventual options."⁷⁵ The Radcliffe proposals were accepted in principle by the Turkish Cypriots. Since they brought up the issue of partition and not Enosis or self-determination, the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots rejected them out of hand. Partition had been proposed as a possible solution to that problem. A glance at a detailed map of Cyprus shows that the two peoples were neither geographically isolated nor economically divisible. The British proposal did not take into account the experiences of Greece and Turkey during the early 1920s — it can be assumed another population exchange would have occurred. Hence, the ensuing voluntary exchange of populations, presumably financed by the United States or Great Britain, would have been impracticable and dangerous.

1957 saw a change in British attitude. Macmillan, who believed only Makarios could halt the killing, ordered the release of Makarios from the Seychelles in April. Makarios was allowed to fly to Athens but not to Cyprus. His release was met by protests and demonstrations throughout Turkey. The troops which had been withdrawn from Suez returned to the fray allowing the British to regain their pre-Suez grip on the island. They were so successful that by the time Makarios was released, the

⁷⁵ Panteli, op. cit., p. 286.

security forces had killed over sixty EOKA men and destroyed eleven of sixteen known "gangs."⁷⁶ Grivas was forced to ask for a truce and the rioting and bombing virtually ceased. The Greek government had encouraged Makarios to discourage any further EOKA action. For the Greeks, the problem now was the Turkish government which had remained quiescent while Great Britain was committed to staying in Cyprus. With Britain anxious to depart, Turkey became more aggressive stating they would not accept a Greek Cyprus so close to their coastline. Furthermore, the Greeks warned Makarios that with the police and other Turkish Cypriot manned auxiliaries on the island already fighting EOKA and with the presence of the TMT, the violence could easily spread into a civil war. Makarios simply asked, not ordered, Grivas to stop fighting. In rejecting a permanent cease-fire and settlement, both Grivas and Makarios chose to ignore the reality of a strong Turkish army only a few miles away which could easily intervene in Cypriot affairs.

A proud but poor people, the Greeks since their independence have been forced to depend heavily on the support of powerful allies. This support is more often than not tied to the objectives of the sponsoring powers. In promoting their interests, the Greeks often lost

⁷⁶ Dewar, op. cit., p. 77.

track of their place in the greater scheme of Cold War realpolitik. This blind spot was in effect the "Achilles Heel" of the Enosis movement. Grivas and Makarios seriously underestimated the greater need for regional stability which depended upon Turkey. Greece overestimated its role as a player in the region. The convoluted methods Makarios often employed had a Machiavellian ring to them and did not take into account the greater and far more important cat and mouse game being played by NATO and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, his methods as well as the sheer obstinacy of his all or nothing policy lost Cyprus.

To the Turks, Enosis was the continuation of the Greek policy to realize the Megali Idea. Since the acquisition of the Dodecanese at the end of World War II, Greece's appetite for expansion seemingly increased. The Turkish Cypriots would never consent to Enosis as their future on the island had already been made clear to them. Based on the violence perpetrated on them by EOKA, the Turkish Cypriots saw there was no room for them in a Greek Cyprus. On the other hand, the Greeks had become angered when the British had taken the Turks into their confidence. The Greeks viewed Turkish involvement in Cyprus in legal terms. Turkey had renounced any claim to the island based on its acceptance of all terms as outlined in the Treaty of Lausanne. After all, had not Mustapha Kemal Ataturk refused to become embroiled in the affairs of the island?

Be that as it may, Greeks are still critical of Great Britain for bringing Turkey into the settlement. Realistically, the legality of any treaty and the practical application of its articles is assured only if the parties involved are willing to enforce them. For Greeks to argue against Turkey's involvement based on the Treaty of Lausanne ignores the simple fact that Great Britain, having considered Turkey's importance in the post-World War II world, made Turkey a player in Cyprus' affairs in the 1950s. To have remained aloof from the reality of that fact should be seen as a great diplomatic mistake on Greece's part.

After the Suez debacle, the Labor Party was expected to win the elections in Great Britain. At a conference in October 1957, Labor promised support for Greek Cypriot self-determination. Self-determination still meant Enosis. Considering the strong stand Turkey had made against any such move towards Enosis, it showed the Labor Party was willing to risk a confrontation with Turkey, a valuable NATO ally. The talk of self-determination justified Grivas' desire to continue the struggle for Enosis and Makarios' refusal to talk to the Conservatives.

The Macmillan government replaced Field Marshal Harding with a colonial civil servant, Sir Hugh Foot, a man known for his liberal ideas and close ties with the Labor Party (his brother was a prominent Labor politician).

The Turks had liked Harding's tough approach in dealing with the Greek Cypriots and EOKA and were disturbed by the new appointment. To them, Foot's reputation for liberalism and principled belief in self-determination represented a change in policy which would certainly lead to Enosis. The Turkish government, increasingly more active in Cypriot affairs, responded by renewing their insistence on partition and the establishment of a military base on the island to secure their strategic interests. Foot's arrival, instead of calming the two communities, had the opposite effect. Turkish Cypriots attacked Greek Cypriots who retaliated in kind. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were driven out of areas in which they were minorities, in effect beginning the partition.⁷⁷ Grivas was able to rebuild EOKA during the truce and direct his activities against other Greek Cypriots as well as the British. AKEL members, trade unionists and leftists became the new victims of EOKA violence. Grivas went so far with his anti-communism that Greek Cypriots appealed to Makarios to stop the violence.

The inter-communal violence continued into 1958 with Athens and Ankara under increasing pressure from their people to provide more support for their Cypriot brethren. Cyprus, from a colonial problem, had become

⁷⁷ Nouska, op. cit., p. 56.

an international issue with the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain preoccupied with the island. Harold Macmillan devised a plan under which the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would each have a representative assembly and positions in the government. Under the plan, the governor was to remain a Briton but would have had a Greek and Turkish resident advisor. The Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes immediately accepted the proposal while the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis demanded changes. When the changes were not made, the Greeks rejected the Macmillan plan. The plan made great concessions to the Turkish Cypriots by offering them a separate assembly which in effect was a step towards partition. The proposal of a resident Turkish advisor gave the Turkish government a standing on Cyprus which the Greeks found difficult to accept. With this plan, Great Britain signalled to Greece and the world the growing importance of Turkey in the region.

“The allegation that the British plotted with Turkey during the last years of their rule to bring about partition has become deeply, perhaps ineradicably, rooted in Greek Cypriot and Greek opinion.”⁷⁸ Often repeated since 1974 when physical partition actually occurred, it is a widespread belief and it is hard to convince those who

⁷⁸ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 90.

believe it otherwise. Specifically cited was the British decision to utilize Turkish Cypriots in the security forces during the Emergency. It is alleged that the British trained and armed them, then looked the other way when the weapons were used to fight Greek Cypriots. There is no evidence to prove there was a British "conspiracy" to partition Cyprus, and in light of the police's vulnerability to Enosist sedition described earlier, this accusation is baseless. There are other reasons to consider for British support of the Turkish aims.

With the advent of the Cold War, Turkey was an important member of the NATO alliance from the beginning. Turkey provided the West with air bases and other vital facilities on the Soviet border. Turkey was also a member of the Baghdad Pact. Clearly, any solution to the "Cyprus Question" not involving Turkey would be viewed as a slap in the face by Ankara. The United States, even more concerned with this issue's impact on NATO and its defense plans, appealed to Athens to promote a solution.⁷⁹ The Greeks had finally realized that the Turks, much to their dismay, were to be a part of the solution.

Makarios though was not ready to abandon Enosis easily. He turned to the Labor Party again for support. He was informed that unless he was willing to compromise,

⁷⁹ Xydis, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

they too would support the Macmillan Plan. Makarios, without consulting the Ethnarchy, Grivas or anyone else, reacted in an uncharacteristically impulsive manner. He told the Labor Party he would give up his desire for Enosis in return for Cyprus' independence without Turkish or Greek involvement! Astonishing everyone, especially the Greek Foreign Ministry, many, including Grivas, thought he allowed any hopes of Enosis to evaporate. This act may not have been as rash as initially thought. By asking for independence, he could then facilitate Enosis by acting as a truly independent nation.

As the political situation on the island worsened from 1954 onwards, the Greeks sought to have the issue of self-determination brought up in the United Nations on an annual basis. The British maneuvered skillfully and successfully avoided having the issue come to a vote. This changed in late 1958 when a decisive meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers took place in New York.

The Greek government had been backed into a corner with the Macmillan Plan which meant the inclusion of Turkey in the government of the island, so they fully supported Makarios' case for independence. Turkey argued there were two communities on the island and that independence would still lead to Enosis. Great Britain, Turkey and their allies again managed to prevent a resolution of the problem which was satisfactory to Greece. The Greeks were not

pleased with the outcome as it now made them appear to be the cause of dissension in NATO. A few days later, on 6 December 1958, Fatim Zorlu (the Turkish Foreign Minister) and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza (the Greek Foreign Minister) met again. Alone they began their own discussions in which Turkey proposed a federal structure whereby Turkey and Great Britain would obtain sovereign military bases.⁸⁰ They both met again in Paris and Zurich in January 1959. Although not directly involved in the talks, the British were asked for a statement in which they would agree to give up their sovereignty over the island in return for the use of the two bases it required. The Turkish government asked for but did not receive a military base on Cyprus. Instead, the Greeks and Turks agreed to each deploy a 650-man army contingent. The Turks thus secured a legitimate military presence on the island. The remainder of the Zurich agreement provided for the creation of an independent, bi-communal, officially bi-lingual Cypriot Republic and furnished guidelines for the framing of a constitution. There was to be a Greek Cypriot elected president and a Turkish Cypriot elected vice-president, each with substantial veto powers over government action. All subordinate parts of the government were to be intertwined and mutually restraining.⁸¹ The documents

⁸⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, op. cit., pp. 302-303.

⁸¹ Lapping, op. cit., p. 344; also see Appendix A.

were then taken to London to be signed. Initially, Makarios, who had been kept informed as the negotiations progressed and had been pleased by the results, expressed his displeasure over the substantial (as he saw them) rights given to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Although there were flaws and Makarios again considered rejecting the proposals, he relented for the good of the Cypriot people. Eventually the agreements designed to protect all interests were signed. This officially ended Great Britain's rule as it acquired the two sovereign bases it wanted at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. The insurgency had cost the British 90,000,000 pounds sterling and just over one hundred lives. The cost to EOKA was substantially less, 50,000 pounds sterling.⁸² Faced with a difficult situation, the British made mistake after mistake. They seemed to have learned little or nothing from their previous experiences of fighting independence movements elsewhere. EOKA was successful and the British measures inadequate. The British made military and political mistakes. They attempted to fight EOKA with conventional ground troops in a security forces role. Grivas operated in such a way that negated the vast advantage the British enjoyed in manpower and material. In this light, Field Marshal Harding's appointment was a mistake. EOKA's

⁸² Carver, op. cit., p. 60.

objectives were political not military. Their aim was not to fight the British army out of Cyprus but to blackmail them out. Britain had paid a heavy price in lives, money and prestige with nothing to show for it than a paper compromise that was worse than defeat.

In December 1959, Makarios was comfortably elected president by 90.53% of the vote and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk president.⁸³ A Joint Constitutional Committee made Greek, Turkish and Cypriot legal experts took eighteen months to draft a constitution, a document which was signed on 16 August 1960.⁸⁴ With a document of doubtful validity making it illegal to campaign for Enosis or partition, Cyprus became an independent republic. Great Britain, pleased with its departure from Cyprus, along with Greece and Turkey became the three guarantor powers, each with the right to intervene should the constitutional arrangements be upset.

The British policy of "imperial favoritism" towards Turkey did not succeed in crushing the Greek Cypriot desire for Enosis or the Greek desire to help the Greek Cypriots achieve that goal. The frustrating tendency of British fair-mindedness as evidenced in their "concern" for the Turkish Cypriot minority may have induced them to bring

⁸³ Panteli, op. cit., p. 330.

⁸⁴ Oberling, op. cit., p. 63; also see Appendix B.

Turkey into the negotiating process. On the other hand, the potential dissension the "Cyprus Question" would have caused in the southeastern flank of NATO may have convinced Britain that Turkish involvement was the best option available. By involving the Greek and Turkish governments in the problem, Cyprus was made to appear as a Greco-Turkish dispute with the British holding the balance. It very well may have been American pressure which convinced the British government to settle the Cyprus problem within the framework of NATO. Obviously, such a solution would safeguard the interests of all.

Greece on the other hand was anxious to maintain good relations with Great Britain and, to a certain extent, Turkey. The ideal settlement for the Greeks seemed to have been the end of British colonial rule and Cyprus' independence where they could have had a say in Cypriot affairs, not immediate Enosis. Pressure was brought on Makarios to fall in line and he was presented with a fait accompli. In the end, Great Britain approached the Cypriot Gordian Knot and rather than solve it, chose to cut it. Great Britain ignored the basic realities of the situation on Cyprus and abandoned the island to its fate. In so doing, the British must share in the responsibility for setting in motion the events which led to partition in 1974.

Part Two: The Road to Partition

The Years of Adjustment

The arrangements made negated any concept of a unitary state, as it provided each community with its own leader. Furthermore, the two leaders representing the executive power did not have authority in the sphere of communal affairs of the respective communities. This ensured the widest possible separation and a built-in formula for the prevention of the growth of any Cypriot national feeling. Under these provisions, the two communities were encouraged to look outside Cyprus, to Athens and Ankara, for guidance in religious, cultural and educational matters of importance.⁸⁵

Unfortunately, soon after independence was official in August 1960, "the political life of the new republic of Cyprus started off on a sour note. Makarios had gone on record to declare that he had signed the Accords under pressure and that the national goal of Enosis had remained unchanged."⁸⁶ The Greek Cypriots were "unconvinced" their Turkish Cypriot compatriots had abandoned plans to partition the island. As a result, to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot minority "remained intransigent, suspicious, unaccommodating, and predisposed to adopt, in regard to constitutional and government issues a rigid

⁸⁵ Vanezis, op. cit., p. 107.

⁸⁶ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 19.

posture which tended to divide them further from their Greek compatriot.⁸⁷ The fact remained that Cyprus became a "reluctant republic," a post-colonial nation that was literally forced into independence.

One of the first problems to surface after independence was the issue of proportional representation in the civil service, one of the many problems left unresolved in Zurich. The Turkish Cypriots who had enjoyed disproportionate representation in the civil service, police and gendarmerie of 70:30 claimed that many positions were now being filled by unqualified Greek Cypriots who received their postings based on EOKA affiliation or membership. No fewer than 2,000 positions were contested by the Turkish Cypriots.⁸⁸ The Greek Cypriots desired a more representative ratio of 80:20, which was based on the current census, to be implemented over a period of time. Further quarrels over taxation, legislation for the establishment of separate municipalities, and separate ethnic units within the army brought the government to a standstill.⁸⁹

Cyprus' independence did not relax the inter-communal tensions or decrease the violence. Rather than win the

⁸⁷ Markides, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁸⁸ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 20.

⁸⁹ Markides, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

confidence of Kuchuk and the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios and other ministers were rude and tactless. Considering that there was a Turkish presence on the island and that Turkey had shown the determination to act decisively, Makarios should have exercised more caution.

Both sides continued to make inflammatory remarks in public. Makarios stated the following in a 4 September 1962 sermon: "Unless the small Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered terminated."⁹⁰ Due to the pre-independence amnesty, many EOKA members were now free to move about on the island. Some of them, like Polykarpos Yorgadjis, were appointed to positions of great importance in the government. A former EOKA gunman, Yorgadjis became Minister of the Interior. He proclaimed that "there is no place in Cyprus for anyone who is not Greek, who does not think Greek and who does not constantly feel Greek."⁹¹

This type of rhetoric was not limited to the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash told a group of Boy Scouts on 8 April 1963, "Our flag owes its color to the blood of 80,000 martyrs. I take an oath before it that the Turkish community will never become

⁹⁰ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 133.

⁹¹ Oberling, op. cit., p. 68.

a minority nor will the island ever become Greek."⁹² Editorials in Turkish language newspapers stated partition was inevitable. Schools in both communities were liberally utilized to promote nationalistic ideas. Makarios had the additional advantage of unlimited access to the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) from which regular anti-Turkish radio programs were broadcast.

While the Turkish Cypriots were able to bring about a political deadlock in internal affairs, they were helpless concerning foreign affairs. All ambassadors and ministers were Greek Cypriots. They, with Makarios' blessing, began a systematic pro-Enosis diplomatic campaign in the United Nations and foreign capitals. As the polemics continued, Makarios sent Kuchuk a proposal containing thirteen points designed to break the deadlock created by the constitution. The gist of the proposals was to end the separate political existence of the two Cypriot communities while preserving the wider privileges of the minority. It may be fair to say that the proposals attempted to alter the position of the Turkish Cypriots from a separate community to a privileged minority within a unified state. Some of Makarios' Thirteen Points called for doing away with the veto power of the president and vice-president, unified municipalities, and the reduction of the Public Services

⁹² Markides, op. cit., p. 27.

Commission from ten to five members. Rauf Denktash claimed in his book The Cyprus Triangle that the proposals were not sincere and were rejected by Dr. Kuchuk.⁹³ The Greek Cypriots claim that the plan was turned down by the Turkish Cypriot leader at the behest of Ankara which had partition in mind.⁹⁴ The amendments to the constitution would have deprived the Turkish Cypriots of their veto power which alone prevented the Greek Cypriots from achieving Enosis by legal means. They would have also stripped away the protection of the towns and would have given the Greek Cypriots complete control over the Public Service Commission thereby cheating the Turkish Cypriot communities of their share of projects. To the casual observer the Thirteen Points may have had merit but regardless of who rejected them, the proposals would have wiped out the few protective measures the Turkish Cypriots had.

Meanwhile, another source of friction in the first years of independence was the discovery of the "Akritas Plan." By December 1963, the Greek army contingent had swelled to 10,000 after Greece illegally sent thousands of soldiers to Cyprus disguised as students, doctors, teachers etc.⁹⁵ Many of them were former EOKA men. Their ultimate

⁹³ Denktash, op. cit., p. 26; also see Appendix C.

⁹⁴ Markides, op. cit., p. 28; Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 27.

⁹⁵ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 134.

goal was to implement the "Akritas Plan." In essence, the plan was to throw out the settlement with the Turkish Cypriots and open the road for Enosis. Although there have been doubts as to the authenticity of the document, it was published by people close to Grivas, who may have wished to embarrass the Ethnarch by "exposing his mishandling" of events.⁹⁶ As mentioned before, the origin of the "Akritas Plan" has been questioned. I do not think it should be. Published by Greek Cypriots and apparently never disowned by Makarios, there is a strong case for its authenticity. Actually, Akritas is tied to Makarios' Thirteen Points. The Thirteen Points, if taken as a less than sincere proposal, were designed to provoke violent Turkish Cypriot reaction — giving Greek Cypriots an excuse to use force. By allowing Greek Cypriots to forcefully amend the "negative parts" of the constitution, the Thirteen Points was an attempt at subterfuge; rather than declare immediate Enosis which would give Turkey an excuse to intervene, Makarios' plan called for Greek Cypriot intervention first. In essence, it was a high stakes gamble dependent upon the quick execution of the operation.

The plan, made in collusion with mainland Greek army officers, envisioned a quick operation whereby Greek

⁹⁶ Oberling, op. cit., pp. 81-84; Purcell, op. cit., p. 322; also see Appendix D.

Cypriots would take control of the entire island in two to three days, precluding the possibility of Turkish intervention. The weakness of the plan lay in the lack of understanding of the Turkish position. It is certain immediate Enosis would have provoked a very strong Turkish reaction. There is no logical explanation why the planners of Akritas would believe the Turks would not react to an attack on Turkish Cypriots. If authentic, the planners of Akritas again showed the depth of Greek and Greek Cypriot misunderstanding of Turkish policy regarding Cyprus. Of note is the lack of attention given to the "Akritas Plan" in primary Greek sources.

The Turkish government was not idle during this time period and provided the TMT with more weapons. Although the inter-communal violence began in December 1963, other distressing events preceded it. Special "constables" were hired by the Greek Cypriots to man roadblocks and they searched Turkish Cypriots, more often than not physically abusing them. During one of these searches, the "constables" opened fire killing two Turkish Cypriots. Elsewhere (and possibly in accordance with the "Akritas Plan") the Greek Cypriot police, under the command of Yorgadjis, disarmed Turkish Cypriot policemen and with EOKA men under the leadership of Nicos Sampson, a publisher and former "hitman" for EOKA, led attacks on Turkish

Cypriots throughout Nicosia. Many Turkish Cypriots, including women and children, were killed.⁹⁷ Reports of atrocities were numerous and graphic. Turkish Cypriots were murdered in their homes and many were taken hostage. The photographs of murdered Turkish Cypriot children are still prominently displayed at the Nicosia entry point to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and give mute testimony to the barbarity of the attacks.⁹⁸ The fighting spread and in the end over one hundred villages were partially or completely destroyed. Hundreds of shops were looted and damaged. Nearly 25,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees.⁹⁹ The Turkish Cypriots fled to their communities where they tried to protect themselves as best as they could. Turkey responded by sending jet aircraft over Cypriot airspace as a warning. The Greek and Turkish army contingents were both actively involved in the fighting. The Turkish contingent took positions along the northbound Nicosia-Kyrenia road and the Greek contingent deployed in anticipation of a Turkish assault from the mainland. Makarios, fearing unilateral Turkish intervention, agreed to a cease-fire on 26 December 1963 under the supervision

⁹⁷ Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, pp. 11-13.

⁹⁸ In June 1992, I visited the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. One can see these pictures in a glass display case between the Nicosia "Green Line" entrance to the TRNC and the customs area.

⁹⁹ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 146; Oberling, op. cit., pp. 239-242.

of a British peace-keeping force with Greek and Turkish military liaison officers.

The 2,700 man British force under the command of Brigadier Peter Young was deployed from the "sovereign" bases creating a buffer zone between the two communities which was to be known as the "Green Line." The buffer zone laid the foundation for permanent Turkish Cypriot enclaves on Cyprus.¹⁰⁰ The Turkish Cypriots took over complete military and administrative control of their communities. Greek Cypriot troops, police and officials were not admitted nor were any Greek Cypriots.¹⁰¹ As the Greek Cypriots blockaded the Turkish Cypriots in their enclaves, the London-Zurich Accords seemed doomed. In January 1964, representatives from the three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and Great Britain) met in order to find a solution to the new problems on Cyprus. The atmosphere at the Tripartite Conference in London was emotionally charged as the Greek Cypriots repeated their demand for amending the constitution. The Turkish Cypriots in turn asked for partition as the only viable solution to the inter-communal violence. Great Britain attempted to offer both sides a compromise but neither side would back down. Of more concern was the fact that the conflict threatened the

¹⁰⁰ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 31.

¹⁰¹ Lapping, op. cit., pp. 350-351.

southeastern flank of NATO. The NATO Commander in Chief, General Lyman Lemnitzer, flew to Athens and Ankara in hopes of providing a NATO solution. His plan called for the deployment of NATO troops in order to quell the fighting.¹⁰² In the end a United Nations solution to the problem was sought in the form of a peace-keeping force. The United Nations in a resolution authorized the creation of UNFICYP (UN Forces in Cyprus).¹⁰³ In June 1964, the Canadian army contingent arrived and took up position in the name of UNFICYP.¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, the inter-communal fighting continued unabated with both sides becoming hardened to the atrocities being committed in the name of Enosis and partition. The British role in Cyprus has been well established thus far. But what of the United States?

As the three main protagonists were members of NATO, it was natural for the United States to become involved. President Johnson perceived that a serious conflict over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey would greatly weaken the southeastern flank. Turkey, as mentioned before, was especially important. As the violence on Cyprus increased, more Turkish jet aircraft menacingly flew over Cyprus

¹⁰² American Foreign Policy Institute, NATO, Turkey and U.S. Interests, pp. 28-34.

¹⁰³ Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations on the Cyprus Problem, 1964-1992, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Harbottle, The Blue Berets, pp. 64-67.

as the Turkish government again threatened military intervention. In June, President Johnson sent Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu a strongly worded letter which apparently dissuaded him from further action. Although the letter was not initially published, much was made of it in the Turkish press. Some newspapers went as far as to claim the US Sixth Fleet (which had discretely sailed to the area) was prepared to attack any Turkish ships enroute to Cyprus.

The letter apparently did use strong language in order to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece. The letter also reiterated that military action would in effect bring about partition, producing a solution specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee and that Turkey would be violating a number of international commitments, namely to NATO and the United Nations.¹⁰⁵ Even though the contents of the letter were finally disclosed and found to be less offensive than popularly imagined, it is still apparently a sore point with some in the Turkish military.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the news of the letter caused the latent anti-Americanism which was growing in Turkey to be expressed in the form of riots throughout Turkey.

¹⁰⁵ Purcell, op. cit., p. 362.

¹⁰⁶ Parker T. Hart, Tw: NATO Allies at the Threshold of War, p. 15.

Unfortunately, this was seen by Athens as a sign the United States would be willing to stop any (emphasis added) Turkish intervention, therefore opening the road for Enosis. This assumption would cost Cyprus and Greece dearly. The fighting on Cyprus affected the lives of Greeks living in Turkey as well. In a retaliatory measure, the Turkish government expelled nearly 8,000 Greeks from Istanbul and confiscated their property.¹⁰⁷

In July 1964, another opportunity to provide the solution everyone would be satisfied with was lost again. That month, representatives from Greece and Turkey were in Geneva discussing the situation on the island. President Johnson, concerned about the ill effects of the crisis on NATO and to curb Soviet infiltration in the area, sent former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to observe and report on the talks. Acheson conceived a plan which may be considered the cornerstone of United States policy concerning Cyprus. It basically involved "double Enosis." Acheson proposed that the union with Greece proceed. In return, Turkey was to receive the Greek island of Castelorizo (near Turkey's Aegean coastline) and one-fifth of Cyprus in the north was to be a self-governing, federated Turkish Cypriot enclave that could be utilized as a military base. There was also to be a joint military

¹⁰⁷ Hitchens, op. cit., p. 57.

command set up for Greece and Turkey and compensation was to be paid to all Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island.¹⁰⁸

The plan was agreed to by the delegates present but once passed on to their respective governments it was rejected. Turkey saw the plan as a basis for further negotiation, mainly over the size of the area they were to acquire. George Papandreu, the Prime Minister, turned the plan down under pressure from Makarios and his own son Andrew (then a minister, later to become Greece's first socialist Prime Minister.)¹⁰⁹

It can be said that the Acheson Plan offered partition disguised as Enosis. Makarios categorically repudiated the plan as he was not prepared to accept the partition in lieu of "genuine" Enosis. The Prime Ministers of both countries met with President Johnson in a Washington summit meeting. Johnson surprisingly made veiled threats against the Greek Prime Minister and Greece's role in NATO. Even more surprising was his retort to the Greek ambassador Alexander Matsas who tried to explain Greece's position on the Acheson Plan a few days later. Johnson supposedly replied, "Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If

¹⁰⁸ Purcell, op. cit., p. 365.

¹⁰⁹ Nouska, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's truck, whacked good... If your Prime minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, and his parliament and his constitution may not last long."¹¹⁰ Soon after the offer of the Acheson Plan, the Papandreu government fell and the upheaval that followed in the next few years led to the 1967 coup. With this new failure, another significant opportunity for a solution was lost. Makarios opposed the Acheson Plan, which in his view would have carved Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sectors, and was adamantly against the idea of a strong Turkish military base on Cyprus. He also saw a United Nations solution as the best guarantee of the territorial integrity of the island. Many Greek Cypriots viewed NATO as a pro-Turkish organization and were suspicious of the readiness with which Athens accepted "NATO solutions." The tension between Athens and Nicosia increased as Greek politicians, who believed they were totally responsible for all of Hellenism, insisted that Makarios follow and obey the Greek government. The differences between Makarios and Athens over the political questions led to divergent policies on Enosis.

With this breakdown in talks, inter-communal fighting continued, culminating in summer 1964 with the most serious

¹¹⁰ Hitchens, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

fighting to date taking place in August. The Greek Cypriots claimed the Turks were smuggling more men and arms into the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The local UNFICYP commander expressed his concern over the possible outbreak of violence when nearly 2,000 Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen were deployed against five hundred Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots feared the expansion of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves near Mansoura-Kokkinia in the north. The UNFICYP commander was correct — fighting did break out, with the majority of the casualties being Turkish Cypriots.¹¹¹

The Greek Cypriots launched their attack on 3 August 1964 and Turkish aircraft appeared firing warning shots. The Mansoura area was overrun as the Greek Cypriots pressed their attack on the 8th when fired upon by Turkish warplanes. The Turkish warplanes flew over Cyprus again on the 9th, this time attacking civilian targets as well.¹¹² Turkey and Greece came close to war that summer when they both deployed substantial forces in Thrace. Reason prevailed for the time being as a United Nations sponsored cease-fire came into effect on the 10th. The Greek Cypriot blockade of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves

¹¹¹ Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, pp. 53-54.

¹¹² Purcell, op. cit., pp. 351-352.

continued. Greece and Turkey had begun fighting — where was the third guarantor power?

As one of the guarantor powers, Great Britain was responsible for enforcing the Treaty of Guarantee and chose not to do so in accordance with that treaty.

The British government shamefully chose inactivity in lieu of a firm response which would have displayed the determination of an influential nation. In 1964 it was unquestionable that there were grounds for intervention by Britain. The legal argument put forth by the British government against intervention is open to argument as Article IV of the treaty clearly states that "each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."¹¹³ It is not surprising that the British government balked at being dragged back into the morass of renewed armed conflict in Cyprus. Great Britain had paid a heavy price in the 1950s, but had the British government acted with more courage and re-imposed the 1960 settlement, Cyprus may not have been partitioned ten years later. Great Britain saw any form of unilateral intervention as impractical. Based on the Treaty of Guarantee, the only practical way to intervene was in agreement with the other two guarantor powers,

¹¹³ Reddaway, op. cit., p. 149.

Greece and Turkey. Intervention against Greek Cypriots must have had Greek support. Action against Turkish Cypriots without Turkish support was not an option either. Confrontation with Greece or Turkey was unwise. The British government failed in its obligation to seriously fulfill its function as a guarantor and by not exercising the positive powers of political intervention. The British government chose to "scold Makarios" which had no practical effect.

It is interesting to examine the evolution of Greek Cypriot foreign policy during the first four years of Cyprus' independence. Because of Cyprus' geographical location, Cyprus has been conditioned by the power politics of the region.¹¹⁴ Makarios' approach to politics was pragmatic, his objectives being always the welfare of his people. "From a pragmatic point of view, Cyprus had to free itself from the treaty obligations which hampered its full independence in order to carry out self-determination which would be the stepping stone to Enosis."¹¹⁵ Makarios sought to gain independence through the United Nations. He came to believe that the only way to accomplish this was through a policy of non-alignment, a policy expected from a country emerging from colonialism. Such a policy was

¹¹⁴ Vanezis, Makarios, Pragmatism v. Idealism, p. 122.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 123.

certainly not pleasing to Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, nor to the United States and Great Britain.

Earlier, in September 1961, Makarios had attended the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries while following the policies of the emerging nations in the United Nations. Makarios developed a relationship with the leading figure of non-alignment, President Nasser, and openly flirted with the Soviet Union and China. The policy of non-alignment put him out of step with Greece as their ideas on how and when to achieve Enosis changed. The Greeks believed Enosis should occur within the framework of a NATO sponsored solution. Makarios felt he must first strengthen Cyprus' standing as an independent nation, then with that strength, determine Cyprus' future. His support came from the emerging non-aligned and often communist nations, an embarrassment to the staunchly anti-communist governments of Greece.

It is also interesting to note that in some sectors of Greek Cypriot society, Enosis had lost its appeal. The self sacrificial nationalism of the EOKA days was absent in post-independence Cyprus. As early as 1965, a public opinion poll showed that most Cypriots opted for continued independence over Enosis.¹¹⁶ Part of the reason may have been the constant threat of a Turkish invasion and Greece's

¹¹⁶ Markides, op. cit., p. 76.

perceived inability to face the Turkish government. Independence in 1960 contributed to the emergence of a political infrastructure in Cyprus, albeit a fragile one. Previously, the political power rested in the hands of the Ethnarchy and a few others who shared the dream of Enosis. With independence came the opportunity to channel a variety of political interests previously suppressed because of EOKA's nationalist struggle. Groups began to emerge that supported independence, not Enosis. More contact with Greece after 1960 erased many of the illusory views held by many of the "Motherland." Quite simply, Greeks and Greek Cypriots — although sharing the same culture, their society and many of their institutions — were different and often contradictory. Cyprus was spared the disasters which befell Greece in the twentieth century. Unhampered, the Cypriots developed a prosperous merchant class which contributed to a higher standard of living than in Greece. Many Greek Cypriots did not want Cyprus to become a poor neglected province of Greece. Unfortunately, this point is lost on many Greeks who do not comprehend the change in attitude.

The progression of events leading to the Turkish intervention and eventual partition in 1974 can be traced back to the first four years of Cypriot independence. Great Britain handed over power to the new republic and troubles started immediately as tension mounted and the

Greek and Turkish Cypriots began to confront each other directly. The continuing overt advocacy of Enosis provoked the threat of partition from the Turks. Representatives from both communities confronted each other in government over their interests. The Greek Cypriots blatantly attempted to alter the fragile political status quo by offering unacceptable constitutional amendments to the Turkish Cypriots. When this failed, they attacked the Turkish Cypriots as part of a greater plan. The Turks threatened to intervene and only the subsequent United Nations mediation effort saved the Republic of Cyprus.

The first four years of Cypriot independence was indicative of what would happen later on. The British washed their hands of Cyprus, acting more as a bystander than as a guarantor of a major treaty. Greek obstinacy and their blind adherence to Enosis under NATO auspices and the Greek Cypriot insistence on ignoring the reality of Turkish policy towards Cyprus contributed to the eventual downfall of Cyprus.

1965-1968

The beginning of 1965 found the situation on the island unchanged with the slight difference being that the clashes between the two communities had subsided somewhat. It was also a year of intense diplomatic activity. In September 1964, United Nations Secretary General U Thant

appointed Galo Plaza, the former president of Ecuador, as mediator for Cyprus. In March 1965, Plaza submitted a lengthy document written in the vague language of the United Nations. His report, which included a background summary of the dispute and the positions of the parties involved, was extremely disturbing to the Turkish government. In his report, Plaza, while excluding Enosis, minimized the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots even though the Indian UNFICYP commander had described the conditions as "scandalous and degrading."¹¹⁷ He described the trend towards bi-zonality, which the Turkish Cypriots desired, as a "desperate step in the wrong direction" and questioned the wisdom of retaining the 1960 guarantees and other protective measures which the Turkish Cypriots considered vital to their well being.¹¹⁸ Plaza made it clear that a settlement should be based upon continued independence which gave the Cypriots the freedom to accept or reject Enosis. The contents of the report were generally accepted by the United Nations. The Turkish government reacted harshly by asking for Plaza's dismissal as a mediator. Plaza resigned at the end of the year. In the meantime, the political climate in Turkey changed when the successors of Adnan Menderes were returned to power in the October

¹¹⁷ Purcell, op. cit., p. 355.

¹¹⁸ Oberling, op. cit., p. 125; Nouska, op. cit., pp. 94-98; also see Appendix E.

1965 elections. Menderes, who had earlier championed the cause of partition, was overthrown in May 1960. The return of his successors in 1965 intensified the Turkish interest in Cyprus' affairs. Their return to power should have come as a warning to Greece and Greek Cypriots. The nature of the conservative political regime in Turkey was to have a direct impact on the Turkish Cypriot leadership by pushing the moderates to the side. Mainland support for the Turkish Cypriots became decisive and Turkey from now on played an increasingly active role in Cyprus.

In an effort to boost their morale, the Turkish Cypriots appeared visibly more militant. Over the months, parades of military character were held on various holidays. More often than not, they openly displayed their weapons as the Greek Cypriots did. On the other hand, Makarios "devoted his energies to winning over nations of the world to his point of view and making life as unpleasant as possible for the Turkish Cypriots in the hope they would immigrate or bow to his will."¹¹⁹ The Cypriot president, proclaiming his non-alignment, openly flirted with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, even going as far as receiving arms and World War II vintage tanks from them.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Oberling, op. cit., p. 123.

¹²⁰ Purcell, op. cit., pp. 356-357.

Makarios' successes at the international political level were crowned with a victory in the United Nations in December where he enjoyed the full support of the non-aligned nations. The General Assembly voted that "the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter, entitled to, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference."¹²¹ The resolution was viewed by Turkey as the most serious foreign policy reverse in ten years.¹²²

The situation in Athens had also changed. Politics in Greece had been further undermined by the weakness displayed by Athens in its policies over Cyprus. A scandal broke out when a "leftish" organization of officers named ASPIDA (literally Shield), allegedly led by Andrew Papandreu who was by now openly antagonistic to the Greek monarchy and the United States, was reportedly discovered. George Papandreu's government, greatly embarrassed and in deep trouble over this affair, was forced to step down under palace pressure further weakening Athens' position. This opened the road for the more "conservative" elements in Greece.¹²³ For the next two years, Greece was governed

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 366.

¹²² Ibid., p. 366.

¹²³ C.M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, pp. 6-7.

by caretaker governments as elections were not scheduled until May 1967. What should have been more disconcerting to Greek politicians was that they and both Papandreas had made enemies in the patriotic and rabidly anti-communist military. Army officers who had been members of a rightist secret society named IDEA in the 1940s and 1950s were alarmed by the apparent increase in communist activity and the weakness the Greek government had displayed in international affairs. This group of officers were more ambitious and willing to act decisively in the name of Hellenism.

With the turmoil in Greek politics came a degree of deterioration in the diplomatic position of Cyprus. Following the rejection of the Plaza report by Turkey in 1966 and the change of government in Greece, Makarios now had to face the prospect of Greco-Turkish negotiations, which in a way signalled a return to 1959. Cyprus was an independent nation yet its fate was still being negotiated in two foreign capitals. Makarios, having been accused of abandoning Enosis, made it quite clear to the Greek government that any negotiations with Turkey should not exclude Enosis or include partition.¹²⁴ Such a stand coupled with his continued good relationship with the Soviet Union certainly did not endear him to Athens, which

¹²⁴ Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism, p. 133.

had become exceedingly pro-Western and anti-communist, and may have precipitated the three-way dispute between Makarios, Grivas and Athens. Makarios' policy was still Enosis, but on his terms.

By June 1966, the non-aligned support of Makarios and Enosis had somewhat eroded as did the Soviet Union's which now acknowledged that some form of partition was acceptable. This may be seen as a ploy by the Soviet Union who was trying to foment anti-NATO sentiments in Turkey and was chiefly interested in keeping the problem in the southeastern flank of NATO simmering, deriving what advantage it could.¹²⁵

For the Turkish Cypriots the blockade of their enclaves, which continued unabated since 1964, began to take its toll as the Greek Cypriots imposed harsher economic measures on them.¹²⁶ Although the parades and celebrations took on a less military character, Greek Cypriots who were invited into the enclaves noticed that the Turkish Cypriots were in better spirits and better armed than they had imagined.¹²⁷ As the Greek Cypriots tightened the noose, the Turkish Cypriots became more

¹²⁵ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, pp. 52-53.

¹²⁶ Oberling, op. cit., pp. 127-130.

¹²⁷ Purcell, op. cit., p. 366.

dependent on Turkey for economic support, somewhat raising the standard of life in the enclaves.

Makarios continued to be out of step with Athens' desires when he attempted to put the National Guard under Yorgadjis' control increasing the suspicions of the Greek government. The idea was dropped prompting Grivas to state "There is only one army in Cyprus — the Greek army."¹²⁸ Makarios then attempted to cut the size of that army and increase the police force. An arrangement was made for the delivery of a large amount of Czech weapons (small arms, mortars, rocket launchers etc.). Then a shipment of armored cars was cancelled under Turkish pressure. Naturally, the source of these weapons being communist made Makarios even more suspect to the Greeks who were afraid of everything which originated in the Eastern Bloc.

The next year marked an important turning point in Cyprus' affairs. "The crisis over Cyprus with its anti-NATO orientation via Makarios' non-alignment (policy) together with the discovery of a left wing plot determined the (Greek) hard-line right-wingers to establish a military dictatorship" in Athens.¹²⁹ As mentioned before, elections were to have been held in May 1967. On 21 April, the "para-state" (the ultra conservative elite which did not

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 370.

¹²⁹ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 43.

feel comfortable with a democratic government), deciding it could no longer coexist with formal democracy, seized power in a bloodless military coup. The May elections never took place. The coupists, led by the same officers alienated by George Papandreou, formed a government with which Makarios was ideologically out of step and had no experience in dealing with. It was also not very sympathetic to Cypriot aspirations.

Colonel George Papadopoulos, the new leader of Greece, saw the issue of Cyprus as a weakening factor for Greece and Turkey, NATO's bastions against communism in the region, and adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Turkey on Cyprus. The fear of the Soviet Union and a desire for a strong Turkey became the cornerstone of Greek foreign policy.¹³⁰ The fact that it was a pro-NATO policy that could not support a non-aligned and neutralist Makarios on Cyprus should not be overlooked. Greece issued a proclamation in July 1967 demanding the dismissal of Greek Cypriot leaders who had renounced Enosis and wanted them replaced by leaders who trusted Greece.¹³¹ In the new spirit of conciliation, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Thrace in September where the Greeks reiterated a variation of the Acheson Plan and agreed,

¹³⁰ Vanezis, Makarios, Pragmatism v. Idealism, pp. 134-135.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 134.

in principle, that Cyprus should serve the interests of both Greece and Turkey. The Turkish delegation rejected the proposal insisting on partition or the maintenance of the 1959 settlement.¹³² The Greeks were rebuffed and the talks were a serious embarrassment to the new government.

In November, negotiations between Greece and Turkey were rudely interrupted. Grivas launched attacks on two Turkish Cypriot villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, causing an acute crisis in Ankara. Sentiments were so strong this time that the Turkish Parliament authorized "Turkey to go to war if necessary."¹³³

The Larnaca area had long been a hot spot according to the UNFICYP Chief of Staff Brigadier Harbottle and had been heavily patrolled by the British troops under United National command.¹³⁴ UNFICYP's inability to stop the attacks clearly demonstrated its limited effectiveness. An aggressive National Guard patrol provoked strong Turkish Cypriot reaction in the Kophinou area near Larnaca. Turkish Cypriot roadblocks were established on the Nicosia-Limassol highway in order to demand much needed gasoline (an item in critical need as a result of the Greek Cypriot blockade) from passing motorists.¹³⁵ Several Turkish

¹³² Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

¹³³ Oberling, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹³⁴ Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, pp. 145-146.

¹³⁵ Markides, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Oberling, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

Cypriots were killed in the attack. Turkish planes again flew over the island as warships in Mersin stood by to carry an intervention force. Although Greece and Turkey had mobilized their forces, both sides were convinced by the United States and the international community to show restraint.¹³⁶

Turkey then delivered an ultimatum to the Greek junta which was certain it would face defeat in Cyprus and at the Thracian border. Some of the main points were as follows: Grivas was to be recalled and was to resign from the army. All Greek troops stationed on Cyprus since 1964 above and beyond the 650-man contingent were to be withdrawn. The National Guard was to be disarmed and indemnities paid to Turkish Cypriots.

The departure of the Greek division from Cyprus is an important piece of the Cyprus puzzle. In fact, it is still part of the Greek mythology concerning the partition in 1974. After the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 and during his trial for "crimes against the people," George Papadopoulos was accused of treason of the highest order for allowing the division to leave.¹³⁷ He and other Greek government officials claimed that they were forced to

¹³⁶ Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 42.

¹³⁷ Eleftherios Papadopoulos, Ed., Porisma Tis Exetastikis Epitropis Yia To "Fakelo Tis Kyprou", pp. 214-215.

agree to the withdrawal by the United States.¹³⁸ Grivas departed to a hero's welcome in Athens and the Greek soldiers were withdrawn in December 1967/January 1968. Makarios refused to disarm the National Guard or pay indemnities to the Turkish Cypriots. Regardless of whose decision it was, their withdrawal created a military vacuum on Cyprus and may have left the island open to Turkish intervention. The fact that they were illegally deployed in the first place is lost upon most Greeks. Turkey triumphed in the midst of the confusion caused by the removal of the Greek division and the leverage Athens had over Makarios diminished considerably although many Greek officers remained in Cyprus to train National Guardsmen and fan the anti-Makarios flames. Thus, as the defenses of Cyprus were weakened and Greek influence diminished, Makarios' position was strengthened enabling him to enjoy more freedom in his diplomatic initiatives.¹³⁹ In this political climate, the Turkish Cypriots, realizing the need for a more efficient administrative vehicle, instituted the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration — in effect partitioning the island as inter-communal talks continued.

By 1968, it is fair to say that Makarios enjoyed the support of most Greek Cypriots for his policies. It is

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 51-53.

¹³⁹ Markides, op. cit., p. 134.

true that the majority of Greek Cypriots still felt Greek and celebrated Greek national holidays as they had always done. The economy was doing well and Makarios' reputation abroad was still high. As a test, Makarios held free and open presidential elections which he won handily in February 1968, gaining 95.4% of the votes thereby underscoring the popular support he enjoyed.¹⁴⁰ Yet all of these gains were under threat. Makarios' change of tack away from "genuine Enosis" to the "attainable solution" of an independent sovereign Cyprus led many disgruntled followers to form splinter groups and resort to violence amongst themselves. Some groups, led by former EOKA members, began a campaign of bombings and assassinations reminiscent of the 1950s but now directed against the government.

The Road to Intervention: 1969-1974

Through several terrorist organizations, Enosists began to express their dissatisfaction with Makarios. The prime movers of this opposition were none other than former EOKA gunmen such as dismissed Minister of the Interior Yorgadjis and Nicos Sampson. In March 1970, there was an attempt on Makarios' life. Having flown to a ceremony honoring EOKA dead, Makarios' helicopter was fired upon. He escaped injury but the man accused of orchestrating the

¹⁴⁰ Panteli, op. cit., p. 376.

attempt, Yorgadjis, was found murdered under mysterious circumstances a week later. Although the true identity of his killers was never established, it is generally believed that Makarios may have had something to do with it.¹⁴¹ Makarios' failure to publicly condemn the killing further outraged his opponents.¹⁴²

The already strained Athens-Nicosia relationship was further taxed by the disclosure of the "Hermes" Plan. A document came into Makarios' possession outlining the plan which called for the National Guard, along with its Greek officers, to seize power in Cyprus. Makarios publicly denounced the plan as a forgery but may have actually believed in its authenticity. Nevertheless, a copy of the plan may have come into the hands of the Cypriot government. The plan alleged that Yorgadjis, with the aid of Greek officers and the Athens junta, was behind the failed attempt to kill Makarios. It was rumored that when Makarios pardoned several individuals who were implicated with Yorgadjis, he learned from them that the plan was authentic. Supposing the junta's complicity was fact, the purpose of the attempt on Makarios' life was, without a doubt, to force Enosis with compensation to Turkey, similar to the Acheson Plan, a policy Makarios opposed.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Woodhouse, op. cit., pp. 74-76.

¹⁴² Oberling, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

¹⁴³ Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 76.

As the months went by, the relationship between Athens and Nicosia was anything but cordial. In September 1971, Greece sent Grivas back to Cyprus in order to organize a movement against Makarios and to energize the struggle for Enosis. Thus EOKA-B came into being (literally EOKA No. 2 — in Greece, letters not Roman numerals are used). In collaboration with Greek officers, EOKA-B attacked police stations and planted bombs at several locations.¹⁴⁴

Interestingly, Makarios also survived a farcical "ecclesiastical coup" which attempted to defrock him. Three bishops (of Kition, Kyrenia, and Paphos), claiming that politics and religion did not mix, decided Makarios should resign as he was violating Canon Law. The clerics, all Enosis supporters and backed by Athens, were themselves defrocked by the Supreme Synod which Makarios controlled.

Defeated at the theological level, the Athens junta then resorted to Cold war tactics. In early 1972, Athens protested the delivery of more Czech arms to Cyprus, ostensibly to arm the police. Athens demanded the weapons shipment be handed over to UNFICYP, a demand the Turkish government enthusiastically supported.¹⁴⁵ The arms were turned over.

¹⁴⁴ Vanezis, Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony, p. 49.

¹⁴⁵ Markides, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

Following this event, the Athens junta sent Makarios a very provocative letter. Athens demanded that all anti-junta, anti-Enosis members of his government be ousted. All leftists and Communists were added to the list — about 50% of the government. Makarios naturally rejected this ultimatum and retaliated by demanding all Greek officers leave the island immediately. He called for the return of the ousted Greek King Constantine II to Greece. Thus, Nicosia became a rallying point for anti-junta Greeks, while Makarios boldly publicly denounced Grivas calling him a "common criminal and a blood-thirsty murderer."¹⁴⁶ What Makarios did not realize was that there were larger forces conspiring against him and that he was literally playing with fire by confronting the Greek junta. From the day the Greek military took over in Greece, the Greek Cypriot press and many Greek Cypriots denounced the dictatorship. As a result, the fear and resentment of the junta towards Makarios increased. Makarios had become a symbol of resistance to the colonels. He increasingly was portrayed in Athens as a communist collaborator and anti-Hellene. As their rhetoric increased, so did Makarios' international prestige and authority. Despite this, Makarios failed to prevent the coup against him. He failed to understand

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 170.

just how determined the Greek government was to solve the "Cyprus Question" within the framework of NATO.

The United States policy had favored the junta despite congressional objections. American administrations had indulged the Greek colonels from 1967 onwards. During this period, the junta established itself as the Greek "little brother" and was quite secure in that role. The importance the United States placed on its Greek bases in connection with US policy towards the Middle East should not be overlooked. While the Greek government had been uncooperative during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, in general Greece was forthcoming in matters, if only to acquire more arms. As United States aid continued to increase, Greece under the dictatorship was praised by some in the United States administration for leading Greece into a new "Periclean Age."¹⁴⁷ The "understanding" between the two governments was based on arms sales, political favors and influence peddling.¹⁴⁸ Hoping to achieve an agreement on the home-porting of the US Sixth Fleet in Greece, the Nixon Administration took at face value the assurances by Papadopoulos regarding democratic reform in Greece. Instead of reform, the apathy the United States showed had the opposite effect.

¹⁴⁷ Hitchens, op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

In the summer of 1973, some elements of the Greek Navy mutinied and in November the students of the Athens Polytechnic School rose against the regime. The protest was ruthlessly crushed by the army with great loss of life. Exile and underground movements were galvanized as was Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, the hard core leader of the Greek Military Police, a narrow minded nationalist. George Papadopoulos was removed and Ioannides replaced him. The United States government did nothing about the change and continued its support for Athens.

The change of government was an important event for Cyprus. Papadopoulos had been relatively mild in his dislike for Makarios compared to Ioannides. Ioannides began to speed up the war on Makarios by abandoning the crafty policy of undermining Cyprus through unspoken agreement with Turkey.

In January 1974, Grivas died of a heart attack while in hiding in Limassol. His death encouraged Makarios to take firmer action against EOKA-B. Formally outlawed in April and May, some 200 EOKA-B members were arrested.¹⁴⁹ The Greek officers of the National Guard were then targeted for removal. By June, amidst rumors of an impending Turkish intervention, Makarios reasserted his authority over the National Guard by formally requesting all new

¹⁴⁹ Oberling, op. cit., p. 155.

officer candidates be approved by the Cypriot Ministry of the Interior, not by Athens. Additionally, he took the drastic, and in hindsight, fatal step of reducing the length of service of the National Guard conscripts, thereby reducing the size of the National Guard. Makarios had hoped that his strong stand would have scared Ioannides away. He was wrong, having failed to realize just how determined the junta was to overthrow him.

July 1974: Coup and Intervention

Makarios was convinced that Athens would not attempt a coup against him, although he had stated publicly that there were plots.¹⁵⁰ Makarios saw that he had much popular support and realized that a Greek-inspired coup meant certain Turkish intervention. He failed to see where the junta stood on this matter. Having weathered a student revolt in November and faced with growing discontent, the junta realized it was on its last legs and was desperate for a victory. In early July, coup preparations were finalized in the presence of Greece's military leadership.¹⁵¹

Since 1974, there has always been an assumption in Greece that the United States stage-managed the coup which brought about the partition of Cyprus. This assertion,

¹⁵⁰ Van Coufoudakis, Ed., Essays on the Cypriot Conflict, p. 188.

¹⁵¹ Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 219.

repeated often, has been accepted as fact by many Greeks ever since.¹⁵² There is little question that the United States was well informed about the plot.¹⁵³ The planning had been going on for some time and the CIA was in contact with its Greek counterpart (KYP). The State Department not only knew of the plot but apparently instructed the United States ambassador, Henry Tasca, to warn Ioannides off.¹⁵⁴ Tasca, who did not personally meet with Ioannides, gave the warning to other high Greek officials. At best, the warnings may have been "lukewarm."

The findings of the select bi-partisan Greek committee that sifted through the evidence on the "Cyprus File" clearly agree that Ambassador Tasca received the warning messages from Kissinger to be delivered to Ioannides and that he chose to pass them off to someone in the Greek government.¹⁵⁵ The "warning" delivered was quite possibly a watered down version which Ioannides may have misinterpreted as support. If the means of dissuasion were there, the United States government certainly did not use them adequately.

¹⁵² I have learned this through numerous discussions with Greek army officers and friends.

¹⁵³ Laurence Stern, The Wrong Horse, pp. 103-109.

¹⁵⁴ Hitchens, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

¹⁵⁵ Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 265.

Why would have the United States supported a coup?

Theoretically, the United States may have wanted to be rid of Makarios, who was viewed with increasing mistrust, and also supported the logical result of that step — Turkish intervention and the partition of Cyprus. As there is no evidence to support this "conspiracy theory," one can easily point to past policies such as the Acheson Plan where partition and Enosis were first outlined.

The coup began at 0830 on 15 July 1974. National Guard tanks and troop filled trucks fanned out across Nicosia. Their primary target was the sandstone Presidential Palace Makarios just entered. Tanks surrounded the building and they opened fire on it and Makarios' bodyguard. By 1100, the RIK Radio station broadcast the news of Makarios' death. Nicos Sampson, the former EOKA gunman, was installed as president. Makarios, however, was not killed and with British assistance escaped to Malta. On the 17th Makarios was in England where he received reassurances of British support. Sampson, who the British remembered with contempt from his EOKA days, would not be recognized as president. The United States was not as accommodating. Neither President Nixon nor Kissinger had much regard for Makarios whom they distrusted. To them, he was the "Mediterranean Castro," a stumbling block in relations with Turkey and after the

coup, politically finished. The United States was on the brink of recognizing Sampson.¹⁵⁶

The stupidity of the coup was astounding. In order to allay the fears of the Turkish Cypriots and reassure Turkey, Sampson quickly announced that nothing had changed in the sphere of foreign policy — no Enosis was planned for the future and the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community would be respected.¹⁵⁷ Although Sampson was remembered for his anti-Turkish fanaticism, the Turkish Cypriots, nervous as they were, remained relatively calm. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, refused to recognize Sampson and called for British and Turkish intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. Obviously, only quick and decisive action could have prevented unilateral Turkish action. Much to its discredit, the United States remained silent and the British sent the aircraft carrier "Hermes" to the vicinity of Cyprus. Prime Minister Callaghan, citing the "trauma caused by the Suez expedition," proclaimed Great Britain's unwillingness to intervene, even if obligated to do so by the Treaty of Guarantee.¹⁵⁸ According to Great Britain, intervention was a "discretionary right" she wished not to exercise.¹⁵⁹ The Turkish Prime Minister

¹⁵⁶ Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-113.

¹⁵⁷ Vanezis, *Cyprus, The Unfinished Agony*, p. 61.

¹⁵⁸ Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, p. 255.

¹⁵⁹ Reddaway, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

Bulent Ecevit, on the other hand, interpreted the Treaty otherwise and claimed Turkey's right to intervene militarily, this being the best opportunity to do so. The Turkish government sent Greece an ultimatum demanding Sampson's resignation and the withdrawal of the entire Greek army contingent.

After much deliberation and discussion with the British, the Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus in order to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot minority and restore the lawful government. On 20 July, the Turkish ambassador on Cyprus informed the UNFICYP commander of the impending intervention. Early that morning, a Turkish expeditionary force landed in the Kyrenia area while paratroops were dropped near the Turkish Cypriot enclaves along the road to Nicosia in what the Turks called the "First Peace Operation" (Attila I in Greece). After two days of vicious fighting, the outnumbered and outgunned National Guard and Greek contingent were pushed out of the way.

In the words of historian C.M. Woodhouse, the "West's reaction was unheroic."¹⁶⁰ The United States and Great Britain limited their military operations to the evacuation of civilians from the combat zone. The Greek response at best was feeble. It has been difficult to determine why

¹⁶⁰ Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 153.

the Greek government was so complacent. Based on the "assurances" he claims to have received, Ioannides may have expected the United States, as on previous occasions, to have restrained the Turks.¹⁶¹ The Greek government had not made any realistic plans to support the coup against Makarios militarily; as such they were outmanned and outmaneuvered. The island was out of range for most Greek aircraft and in the end, very few troops actually reached Cyprus from the mainland. The mobilization plans were a farce and Greek military equipment was in such a state of disrepair that any confrontation with Turkey in Thrace would have surely been disastrous for Greece. The majority of the Greek military leadership recognized this and, to their credit, did not allow themselves to be dragged into war with Turkey. They deposed Ioannides and restored the government to civilian leadership.¹⁶² The United Nations naturally passed yet another resolution on Cyprus "deeply deplored" the outbreak of violence.¹⁶³ The Greeks have never been able to stomach the fact that the Turkish army executed a textbook military operation with success. An airborne operation preceded an amphibious assault eventually defeating the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish

¹⁶¹ Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁶² Coufoudakis, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

¹⁶³ Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, op. cit., p. 45.

losses were high, yet they accomplished their assigned tasks. Contemporary Greek sources decry the fact the Turks used "immoral" means to defeat them. Among the examples cited were the following: Greek speaking Turks were used on the radios to confuse Greek Cypriot units, Greek speaking Turks dressed in Greek army uniforms spread panic and confusion in the rear areas of the battlefield and Turkish soldiers dressed in civilian attire mingled with Greek Cypriot refugees freely moving on the battlefield.¹⁶⁴ No Greek I know will ever openly admit Greece was unprepared to fight the Turkish army. To the Greeks, their defeat in battle was a result of Turkish dishonesty and a foreign anti-Greek conspiracy.

Initially, the Turkish assault captured approximately 10% of the island, mainly the enclaves. They soon realized that only overwhelming military superiority would allow them to maintain their precarious hold. It is most likely that Phase I of the operation ended with the cease-fire on the 25th. Politically, the Turks saw that a second "bite" would be a greater bargaining chip. The cease-fire was consistently violated allowing the Turkish army time to deploy additional troops. According to Greek sources, two infantry divisions, two special forces brigades, 220 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and 120 artillery pieces

¹⁶⁴ Nouska, op. cit. pp. 156-157.

were sent to Cyprus for the "Second Peace Operation."¹⁶⁵ As negotiations were being conducted in Geneva, the second operation was launched.

Unlike the incidents of 1963-1964, the victims of abuse were now Greek Cypriots. Foreign correspondents reported numerous acts of violence against Greek Cypriots of all ages and sex. Interestingly enough, Kenan Evren, the former Turkish Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, claimed in a 1990 interview that Turkey did not intend to occupy so much of the island and that the Turkish troops had accidentally spilled over the original cease-fire line (!).¹⁶⁶

In accordance with Resolution 353, the British encouraged the Greeks and Turks to participate in a conference in Geneva. The intent was to prevent more fighting and to develop a permanent settlement. The Turkish government, speaking from a position of strength based on the new realities on Cyprus, was largely able to impose their will on the defeated Greeks.¹⁶⁷ Turkey refused to move their troops claiming they were there based on the Treaty of Guarantee. They insisted that since

¹⁶⁵ Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 174.

¹⁶⁶ Staff Writer, "Turks Sized Too Much Land!", Cyprus Bulletin, 20 October 1990, p. 1.

¹⁶⁷ Oberling, op. cit., p. 171.

the Turkish Cypriots had developed their own national and municipal administrations, only a federated, bi-zonal government would be acceptable. An agreement drafted between Rauf Denktash and acting President Glafkos Clerides allowed for the creation of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State in 34% of the occupied northern section of the island. Greece rejected this as partition. The cantonal alternative was rejected by the Turks.

The Greeks have always believed that the United States did not exert enough pressure on the Turks to stop them from intervening. To this day, the sense of betrayal is acute and Greeks have gone so far as to claim the United States and Britain aided the Turks militarily in their operations. Although probably not widely read, the findings of the Greek bi-partisan committee's examination of the "Cyprus File" places the responsibility for the Cyprus debacle on the junta, while stating the United States could have stopped the intervention and had a "moral obligation" to do so.¹⁶⁸

The Greek claim that the United States and Great Britain supported the Turks militarily is unsubstantiated nonsense, another part of the mythology which surrounds the "Cyprus Question." On the other hand, did the United States have a "moral obligation" to intervene?

¹⁶⁸ Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 266.

Although the United States misjudged the stubbornness of Makarios and the territorial ambition of Greece and Turkey, I instinctively agree with the Greek government — “something” should have been done politically. But upon further reflection, I think the Greek government yet again miscalculated by expecting a “favor” from a powerful ally. An argument can be made for the United States’ inactivity. The United States had weathered another Arab-Israeli war in 1973 which almost involved the superpowers, and was still suffering from the trauma of the Vietnam War and Watergate. It certainly wanted to avoid a confrontation between two NATO allies so “inactivity” allowed Turkey to accomplish partition. Turkey’s views on Cyprus were not a mystery so the Greeks should have realized they were presenting Turkey a golden opportunity to intervene in Cyprus.

1974-1994

Greece reacted by withdrawing from NATO, choosing to carve an independent political path for herself much as France did. The “Greek Lobby” in Washington convinced a reluctant President Ford to approve an arms embargo on Turkey because it had used United States supplied weapons offensively. Makarios returned to Cyprus in December making it clear that any settlement in which a transfer of land would be involved was unacceptable. Even after his death in 1977, the Greek Cypriots have continued the

struggle to re-unify their island. The twenty years since the Turkish intervention have been marked by the passing of numerous resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Turkey's 30,000 troops, something Turkey is very reluctant to do. The Greek Cypriots have categorically rejected partition despite the fact Rauf Denktash declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in May 1983, a country recognized only by Turkey. Turkey's continued deployment of the 30,000 troops and support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been costly. Greece has used the solution of the "Cyprus Question" as a prerequisite for its support for Turkish entry into the EEC. Using the same reason, Greece has successfully blocked much needed EEC financial aid for Turkey as well.

Conclusion

With the proclamation of independence, Cyprus became a sovereign state. The independent Republic of Cyprus was the result of compromise between highly contrasting interests and involved concessions from all concerned.

Great Britain had tenaciously maintained their colonial hold on what was perceived to be a strategic asset. The British reluctantly withdrew granting the island its independence in 1959 under the terms of a treaty of dubious validity. The indifference Britain displayed in the years following the treaty ensured that the vitality of

the new republic was doomed. Unchecked by Britain, Turkish partition was virtually assured. British inaction, and United States acquiescence, was a result of regional Cold War policies. A powerful Turkey in southeastern Europe was an important part of NATO's defense.

Turkey, now a regional power, became an international player due to the Cold War and subsequent NATO membership. The rise of Turkish nationalism, promoted in part by conservative Turkish governments, led to the hegemonic power struggle between Greece and Turkey. Although an inconsequential island, Cyprus focalized the age-old ethnic tension, much the same as the Greco-Turkish war of the early 1920s had.

Turkey's traditional rival Greece based its power on an assumption of importance to NATO as a strategic ally. Weakened post war governments were dependent on Western financial and military support. Post-war nationalism made Cyprus the focal point of attention for Greeks. Nationalism and the increased fear of communism enabled an ultra-conservative military government to take control in Greece. Assuming the role of the protectors of Hellenism, the army officers thrust the "Cyprus Question" onto the political arena, making Enosis an issue of national importance. Their actions were to prove fatal for the Cypriot Republic.

The Turkish and Greek Cypriots became engulfed in the nationalistic struggle. The Greek Cypriots had, from the beginning of British rule, agitated for union with Greece. The position taken by Makarios and Grivas was uncompromising — Enosis or nothing at all. Their nationalism was the basis for the bigotry with which they treated the Turkish Cypriot minority. Over the years, though, the popular support for union with Greece diminished in direct relation to the increase in prosperity engendered by independence. The shift in Greek Cypriot support then became the desire for a non-aligned independent state — without Greek or Turkish ties. The resultant flirtation with communist countries put them at odds with the West and an anti-communist Greece.

The Turkish Cypriot minority, though somewhat repressed under the British, preferred British rule to any possibility of Enosis. Their willingness to work with the Greek Cypriots in order to form an equitable government upon independence diminished as Greek Cypriot agitation for Enosis became unbearable for the Turkish Cypriots. Their desire for closer ties with Turkey swelled and the policy of partition became a rallying point. Turkey's increased interest in Turkish Cypriot affairs was in response to Greek Cypriot nationalism and the terrorism against the Turkish Cypriot minority escalated.

During the years prior to Turkey's intervention in 1974, the overriding importance of NATO's needs led to a shift in the regional balance of power to Turkey. The inability of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to understand this unfortunately led them to commit serious mistakes. Turkey was in a better position to intervene, while Greece and the Greek Cypriots were unable to substantively back their provocative actions.

In the historiography of Cyprus, each side blames the other. The partition of Cyprus occurred as a result of a combination of factors and no party is wholly innocent or wholly guilty. Put into the larger spectrum of post-Cold War politics, Cyprus becomes an insignificant albeit troublesome issue.

With the removal of the Soviet Union as the coalescent element among NATO countries, the jigsaw puzzle of unity breaks into varying political and national interests and policies. Rabid, uncompromising nationalism has become the primary impetus for foreign policy decisions of Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus. We must not forget that the eastern Mediterranean is once again a potential flashpoint. Massive arms purchases by Greece and Turkey have raised fears of a conflict in the region between the two traditional enemies. According to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Greece and Turkey are the

world's two leading arms importers, Greece having spent \$1.9 billion and Turkey \$1.5 billion in 1992.¹⁶⁹

Unfortunately, despite the proclamations of the United Nations Secretary General and other world leaders, there will be no quick solution — I am not sure either side wants one. The image of the Turkish "boogey-man" will continue to serve Greek politicians, the Turks will continue to justify their actions and the West will continue to look the other way.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Borowiec, "Greek-Turkish Arms Race Raises Fears of War in Mediterranean." Washington Post, 27 October 1993, p. A12.

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Appendix A: Conference on Cyprus. (Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute, pp. 144-156.)

CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS

Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House
on 19 February 1959

MEMORANDUM SETTING OUT THE AGREED FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OF CYPRUS

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece and the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic

Taking note of the Declaration by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community and the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community that they accept the documents annexed to this Memorandum as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

Hereby adopt, on behalf of their respective Governments, the documents annexed to this Memorandum and listed below, as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

On behalf of the
Government of the
United Kingdom of
Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

On behalf of the
Government of the
Kingdom of Greece

C. KARAMANIS

A. MINISTERS

HAROLD MACMILLAN

London,
19 February 1959

On behalf of the
Government of the
Turkish Republic

A. MINISTERS

YILMAZ

London,
19 February 1959

List of Documents Annexed

- A. Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus
- B. Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey
- C. Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey
- D. Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on 17 February 1959.
- E. Additional Article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee.
- F. Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on 17 February 1959.
- G. Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot community on 19 February 1959.

III. Declaration made by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot community on 19 February 1959

1. Agreed Measures to prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus.

II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENTS AGREED IN THE FRENCH TEXTS AND INITIALED BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTERS AT ZURICH ON FEBRUARY 11, 1959.

(a)

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

- 1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively.
- 2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.
- 3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.
- Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

- The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.
- 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of 5 years.

- In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively.
- In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days.

- The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 hours after its constitution.

- 5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.

- The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

- Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.
- Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette.

- However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decision of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

- 6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a

period of 5 years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (NB. The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk, and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgement any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law on decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine. The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions, and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (NB. It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment, or municipality in question.

11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent, the organs of the local administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 per cent, by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.

The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judiciary (appointments, promotions of judges, etc.).

17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:

(a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.

(b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within 4 years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to the localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.

21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)

22. It shall be recognized that the total of partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics, and charity belonging to their respective communities. Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors, or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following Ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Finance shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than 3 months from the signature of the Treaties.

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

E. A. T.

† A. M.

F. R. Z.

F. K.

S. L.

Annex I.4

The defence questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:

- (a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them
- (b) Appointments and promotions
- (c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives
- (d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries
- (e) The security questions subject to veto are as follows:

- (a) Appointments and promotions
- (b) Allocation and stationing of forces
- (c) Emergency measures and martial law
- (d) Police laws.

It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.

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Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:

(1) *that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above;*

(2) *that provision shall be made by agreement for:*

(i) *the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus;*

(ii) *the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus;*

(iii) *determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement;*

(iv) *the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.*

C. *That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defence of Cyprus.*

D. *That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.*

ST. WYN LLOYD

ALAN LENNOX-BOYD

F. R. Z.

F. K.

E. A. T.

S. L.

F. R. Z.

F. K.

E. A. T.

† A. M.

F. R. Z.

F. K.

Annex

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:

(a) *to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom Government;*

(b) *to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;*

(c) *to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;*

(d) *to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, etc.);*

(e) *to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified, for troop training;*

(f) *to use the airfield at Nicosia together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;*

(g) *to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;*

Appendix I

(h) *to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,¹ in respect of certain offences committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;*

(i) *to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of Cyprus;*

(j) *to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus.*

IV

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO BE INSERTED IN THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE.

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

S. L. E. A. T. F. R. Z. F. K.

† A. M.

E. A. T.

V

DECLARATION MADE BY GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS ON FEBRUARY 17, 1959

The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, having considered the declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959, accept that declaration, together with the document approved by the Heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, as providing the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

E. AVEROF-TOSIZZA
FAIRUZ ZORLU

S. L.

† A. M.

F. K.

¹ Treaty Series No. 3 (1955), Cmd 9363.

DECLARATION MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

THE VIKING COMMUNITY ON FEBRUARY 19, 1959

and Makarins representing the Great Canadian lumbermen.

...representing the Greek Cypriot community, having examined the document concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 17, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

AKTIVISMO MAKARIS

F. R. Z.

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DECLARATION MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
VII

Dr. Kuchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriot Community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement.

F. KUNICHIK **F B Z**
F. A. T.

AGREED MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS

1. All parties to the Conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the constitution including the elections of President, Vice-President, and the three Assemblies and the Treaties into full effect as soon as practicable and in any case not later than twelve months from to-day's date (the 19th of February, 1959). Measures leading to the transfer of sove-

ightly in Cyprus will begin at once.

The first of these measures will be the immediate establishment of a joint Commission in Cyprus with the duty of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic structure agreed at the Zurich Conference. This Commission shall be composed of one representative each

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of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative nominated by the Government of Turkey, together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich Conference and shall fulfil its task in accordance with the principles there laid down;

(b) a Transitional Committee in Cyprus, with responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting and reorganising the governmental machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus. This Committee shall be composed of the Governor of Cyprus, the leading representative of the Greek community and the leading representative of the Turkish community, and shall be assisted by such other members as the Conference may determine.

conflict with paragraph 5 of the Basic Structure;

(c) a Joint Committee in London composed of a representative of each of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference. This Committee will prepare drafts for submission to Governments covering *inter alia* matters arising from the cession of areas in Cyprus under British sovereignty, the provision to the United Kingdom Government of certain ancillary rights and facilities in the independent Republic of Cyprus, questions of nationality, the treatment of the liabilities of the present Government of Cyprus, and the financial and economic problems arising from the creation of an independent Republic of

3. The Governor will, after consultation with the two leading representatives, invite individual members of the Transitional Committee to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of Government. This process will be started as soon as possible and will be progressively extended.

4. The headquarters mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey will be established three months after the completion of the work of the Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above and will be composed of a restricted number of officers who will immediately undertake the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents will be transferred to the headquarters when the sovereigns will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus on the

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Appendix B: Draft Treaty Concerning the Establishment of
the Republic of Cyprus. (Necari Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute,
pp. 157-162.)

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on the 4th of November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March

DRAFT TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

ARTICLE 1

(1) TREATY OF ESTABLISHMENT

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey of the one part, and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part, Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on the 7th of February, 1959, during the Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.

ARTICLE 2

(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex B to this Treaty.

(2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and co-operate in the common defence of Cyprus.

The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.

The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in section 1 of the European

ARTICLE 6

The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 8

(1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus

(2) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 10

Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled as follows:

(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom

(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the Parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of four representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a citizen of

ARTICLE 5

The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in section 1 of the European

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the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act, and, if he also is such a citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court

ARTICLE 11

The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 12

This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it

(2) TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of *status quo* created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island

ARTICLE 11

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article 1 of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of *status quo* established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island

ARTICLE 111

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

Appendix 2

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers receives the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(3) TREATY OF ALLIANCE

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

- I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them.
- II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack, or aggression, direct or

indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IV

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. I annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus

ARTICLE V

The command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be

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appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President
and the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE VI

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of
the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of
the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article
102 of the United Nations Charter.

ADDITIONAL PROVISION

No. I

I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite
Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers
and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agree-
ment, may request the Greek and Turkish Government, to increase or reduce the Greek
and Turkish contingents.

III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents
participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and
exemptions in respect of customs and taxes as well as other immunities and privileges and
any other military and technical questions concerning the organisation and operation of
the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which
shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.

IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than
three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus
Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged
with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish
contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty
of Alliance.

ADDITIONAL PROVISION

No. II

ARTICLE I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and
Turkey. It shall exercise the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may
take cognisance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the
three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.

ARTICLE II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of
urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special session by its Chairman at
the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

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Appendix 2

ARTICLE III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one
year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is
decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during
the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers,
both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary
for the fulfilment of its task.

ARTICLE IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible
to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it,
during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account
of the Headquarters' activities.

Appendix C: The Thirteen Points. (Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute, p. 182.)

THIRTEEN-POINT AMENDMENTS TO THE
1960 CYPRUS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED
BY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS ON
30 NOVEMBER 1963

1. The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not, as at present, the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

Appendix D: The "Akritas Plan". (Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute, pp. 163-171.)

THE 'AKRITAS PLAN' AND THE 'IKONES' DISCLOSURES OF 1980

(1) WHAT IS THE 'AKRITAS PLAN'?

The Greek Cypriot leadership prepared the AKRITAS PLAN in order to knock the Turks out and realize ENOSIS (union of Cyprus with Greece) ...

(Aristos Katsis, a Greek historian in his article published by the Greek Cypriot daily *Phileleftheros* on 10 November 1979.)

It is the plan of a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, in pre-determined stages and methods, and to bring about the union of Cyprus with Greece i.e. Enosis.

The plan was drawn up by the Greek Cypriot leadership in collusion with Greek Army officers in 1963. It provides, among other things, for the creation of an underground army which, as explained in the 'Plan' would suppress any resistance by the Turks, most forcefully and in the shortest possible time, and make the Greek Cypriots masters of the situation 'within a day or two, before outside intervention would be possible, probable, or justifiable.' The Plan was signed by 'the Chief, Akritas'. It also explains the object of the 13-point proposal put forward by Archbishop Makarios for the revision of the Constitution.

This top secret document was first published by a local Greek newspaper, *Patri*, on 21 April 1966, with the professed intention of exposing the mishandling of the Greek Cypriots 'national cause' by Archbishop Makarios. In a series of articles published subsequently by the same paper, it was disclosed that Archbishop Makarios had assumed the responsibility for the implementation of the Plan, and that he had appointed Mr Polycarpos Vorgaidis, who was the Minister of the Interior at the time, to be the Chief Akritas, together with other top ranking Greek members of the Government as officers of the secret organization.

Certain parts of the English translation of the Plan presented here have been set in italic type in order to underline those salient points which clearly show the relationship between the Plan and the various stages of the Cyprus crisis. This relationship is also very important from the point of view of the United Nations because it shows how the Greek Cypriot leaders, while paying lip service to the UN Charter and to its principles, were deviously trying to use the World Organization as a tool to attain their objectives.

Struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to time, and the measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that *every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and undesirable national objective* which is the full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination.

As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and the handling of our case within and outside the country are different.

A. METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE:

In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. But the question of the Turkish minority had been introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties.

(a) Consequently our *first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved* and that it has to be reviewed.

(b) The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:

- (i) that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just;
- (ii) that the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties;
- (iii) that the demand for the revision of the agreements is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonour their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival for them;
- (iv) that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
- (v) that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely.

(c) Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they were imposed after many threats. *It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought*

(2) AKRITAS PLAN

TOP SECRET: 1
RECENT STATEMENTS BY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS HAVE SHOWN THE COURSE WHICH OUR NATIONAL PROBLEM WILL TAKE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS WE HAVE STRESSED IN THE PAST, NATIONAL

By the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people, acting widely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.

(d) Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives we must materialise the second stage on an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:

(i) that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove the unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism;

(ii) that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;

(iii) (omitted);

(iv) that this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;

and

(v) that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we have our struggle not an ENDS but on self-determination. But in order to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Famagusta, the Treaty of Alliance etc.) and of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external intervention. For this reason our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.

It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialise, our future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions to be taken are as follows:

(a) The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (passage omitted) whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.

(b) Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.

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(c) Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express and apply its will.

(d) It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then be completely independent.

It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (a) to (d) to be carried out in the order indicated.

It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (d) if stage (a) is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements.

The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in the international field.

B. THE INTERNAL ASPECT

Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.

1. The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many similar incidents in recent times shows that in case of intervention, even if legally inexcusable, has the attacker been removed by either the United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions to the detriment of the attacked party.

Even in the case of the attack on Suez by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eliat in the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus. If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e., at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose.

The first step, therefore, would be to 'get rid of intervention by proposing unifications in the first stage. Tactic to be followed: *(omitted)*.

2. It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:

(a) The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c).

(b) Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks.

The first reason is removed as a result of the plan drawn up for the first stage and consequently what remains is the danger of intercommunal strife. We do not intend to encourage, without provocation, in massacre or attack, against the Turks. Therefore, *(section omitted)* the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret, we would always appear to be *ready for peaceful talk*, and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.

3. *(Omitted)*

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible for us to proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as *a first step towards our more General Plan* as described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason the existence and the strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:

(a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks, in towns in particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.

(b) in case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.

(c) The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their community.

(d) in case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.

5. In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through

Appendix 4

at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. *Secret is vitally essential for our success and survival.* This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing to the fact that for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public.

Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities we need a strong and stable Government, *up to the last minute*. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are good for nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. *A typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse to the United Nations.* It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated and kept at a distance.

We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives only verbally. Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the Organisation to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to enlighten others. *No written explanation of any sort is allowed. Loss or leakage of any document pertaining to the above is equivalent to high treason. There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.*

Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who will control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or statement must never be allowed to appear in the press or any other publication.

The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten our members and the public verbally. Every effort must be made to show ourselves as *moderates*. Any reference to our plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is

which is prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.

Note. The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office of sub-headquarters.

The Chief
AKRITAS

Appendix E: Extracts From the Dr. Galo Plaza Report. (Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute, pp. 219-230)

APPENDIX

EXTRACTS FROM
DR GALO PLAZA'S REPORT

(PARAGRAPHS 130-73)

C. Analysis of the parties' positions

130. It will be understood that my own view of the positions taken by the parties to the Cyprus dispute must necessarily be governed by certain criteria. Foremost among these are those which emerge explicitly or implicitly from the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. Others are imposed by the actual circumstances of Cyprus, and I have felt bound to take these into account to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the resolution of the Security Council. According to these criteria, I have concluded that any settlement of the problem must take account of the following considerations:

it must recognize, as the Security Council did by recommending the appointment of a Mediator, that the problem of Cyprus cannot be resolved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before December 1963, but that a new solution must be found.

it must, in order to become an 'agreed settlement', be capable of securing the support of all the interested parties identified by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964, namely, the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and the representatives of the Cyprus communities.

it must be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of which the following in particular seem relevant: the purposes, principles and obligations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognition of the sovereign equality of the Member States, abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and respect for treaty obligations not in conflict with those of the Member States under the Charter.

it must be capable of satisfying the wishes of the majority of the population and at the same time of providing for the adequate protection of the legitimate rights of all of the people.

it should also, in order truly to serve the interests of international peace and security and the well-being of the people of Cyprus, be a settlement capable of lasting.

131. I have examined the positions of the parties with all these considerations in mind. I find it convenient to group my observations under three main headings: (a) independence, self-determination and international peace; (b) the structure of the State; and (c) the protection of individual and minority rights.

(a) Independence, self-determination, and international peace

132. The Republic of Cyprus is a sovereign, independent State: it was admitted as such into the membership of the United Nations, it continues to be a Member State, and the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 refers to it explicitly as 'the Sovereign Republic of Cyprus'.

133. But the burden of the complaint of the Greek-Cypriot leadership and the basis of their political claims—in which they have the support of the Government of Greece—is that the independence and sovereignty of the Republic, and therefore its 'sovereign equality' with the other Members of the United Nations and its 'right of self-determination', were impaired by the Treaties of 16 August 1960 which formed an integral part and governed the nature of the Constitution of the same date. The effect of these Treaties was indisputably to forbid the people of Cyprus from amending their own Constitution, or at any rate the basic articles which determined the structure of the State, to prohibit the union of Cyprus with any other State and to forbid the partitioning of the country. The Greek-Cypriot leadership claims to have accepted these restrictions under duress, in that the only alternative at the time would have been to suffer an attempt to partition the country. The political objective of the Greek-Cypriots has therefore been to secure for Cyprus an 'unfettered independence' which would allow the population freely to determine its own future according to the principle of majority rule and minority protection (including some special transitional measures) and to have the right to set aside the treaty restrictions on both the internal institutions of the State and its external relationships.

134. For their part, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders and the Government of Turkey do not dispute the restrictive nature of the conditions under which Cyprus acceded to independence. From their standpoint, however, these limitations were deliberate and essential: to secure for the Turkish-Cypriots their treatment not as a minority but as a community with distinct political rights, and to secure for Turkey the maintenance of an equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean which, in the Turkish Government's view, would be especially seriously disturbed should Cyprus become Greek territory. These two basic purposes complement each other, and help to explain the solidarity of the attitude of the Turkish-Cypriots and the successive Turkish Governments towards the settlement of the problem. They contend that any acceptable alternative to the 1960 settlement must serve exactly the same purposes. For them, therefore, any formula envisaging Cyprus continuing as an independent State must contain a guarantee against union with Greece and iron-clad protection of the safety and rights of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community: hence their proposal for the geographical separation of the two Cyprus communities under a federal government bound by treaty obligations against union with any other country and also 'as their own *quid pro quo*... against the partitioning of Cyprus. Likewise, they contend that any right of self-determination accorded to the Greek-Cypriots could only be accorded as an equal but separate right to the Turkish-Cypriot community; if the Greek-Cypriots chose to exercise it in favour of union with Greece, the Turkish-Cypriots would be free to exercise it in favour of union with Turkey, insisting therefore on the partitioning of the country.

135. Different though these approaches may be, it is still possible to read into the positions of the two sides an objective which, so long as it is stated in very broad terms, would seem acceptable to them both: namely, an independent Cyprus with adequate

safeguards for the safety and the rights of all its people. I have found it useful, in my own examination of their positions, to trace the paths back from that apparent common objective to determine where and why they diverge, and to consider the alternative routes that appear open.

136 If the independence of Cyprus is to be considered as the first and most important basic principle on which the parties could agree, it will be necessary for all the parties to understand and agree on what it means in the context of the circumstances of Cyprus. And it is here that the most difficult aspect of the whole problem arises. The Greek-Cypriots have couplled their aspiration for 'unfettered independence' with the demand for the right of self-determination. Many of them have not concealed their hope and belief that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has not concealed its suspicion and fear that the purpose and result of the exercise of this right would be to realize the long-cherished aspiration for union (*Enosis*) with Greece. These hopes on the one hand, and fears on the other, have been encouraged by the knowledge that the necessary consent of the Greek Government would be forthcoming. As far as the positions of the other parties are concerned, there has been a tendency by the Greek-Cypriots to disregard them on the assumption that 'unfettered independence' and the removal of the treaty limitations would already have been achieved, leaving self-determination in this sense a matter between Cyprus and Greece exclusively.

137 I am certain in my own mind that the question of *Enosis* is the most decisive and potentially the most explosive aspect of the Cyprus problem. I have been assured by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and by the successive Governments of Turkey that any attempt to bring it about against their will would provoke active and vigorous resistance. And I judge this to be true, short of a change in attitudes which only a long passage of time could bring about. I feel bound, therefore, to examine this question with the greatest care.

138 The question of *Enosis* itself has several aspects. If its imposition in present circumstances would be judged from the Turkish side as tantamount to an attempt at annexation to be resisted by force, it is also a question which, to the best of my understanding, does not enjoy unequivocal support among the Greek-Cypriots as a whole. It is true that among them, as among many people in Greece, the word and the thought of *Enosis* have a highly emotional quality; it serves to some as a symbol of Pan-Hellenistic ideals to others as the battle-cry of the resistance against colonial rule, and in the worst times of the present crisis it seemed like a banner under which the Greek-Cypriot community as a whole found their rallying-point. But as a practical step in the political evolution of Cyprus it has struck me, in discussions with a wide range of Greek-Cypriot opinion as having a much less uniting and imperative driving force behind it.

139 This may be in part because there have been few precise indications of the form which *Enosis* should take and of the economic, social and political consequences which would flow from it. I understand *Enosis* to mean in its literal sense the complete absorption of Cyprus into Greece, but I would hesitate to say that this is what every Greek-Cypriot favouring it intends it to mean.

140 The Greek-Cypriot leaders in the Government of Cyprus - maintaining the position that *Enosis* would be a matter purely for Cyprus and Greece to decide could tell me nothing about the form in which they envisaged it taking place except that this would be determined by the Cyprus Government in agreement with Greece before the Cypriot people were consulted on the subject. I had sought clarification of this question

not only because of the existing Turkish opposition to the idea but also because I had no doubt that the implementation of *Enosis*, even should it be accepted as an element of the settlement of the Cyprus problem, would entail many complex problems, political, economic, financial and other. For example, Cyprus and Greece have not different bases for their systems of law and administration of justice; Cyprus, which produces essentially the same sorts of agricultural commodities as Greece, now exports most of its products to the United Kingdom under conditions of Commonwealth preferences; it has a higher standard of living and a higher wage level, a different tax structure and a more comprehensive social security system; it also has a different currency system and, being a member of the sterling bloc, its pound is maintained on a parity with the pound sterling and under present arrangements is freely convertible into any other sterling bloc currency and relatively freely convertible for dollars.

141 All such matters would require adequate adjustment should *Enosis* be brought about. Their effects would vary widely depending upon whether *Enosis* would take the form of a complete union with Greece, in the sense that Cyprus would become one or more provinces of Greece, or whether Cyprus would be given some privileged status within the Kingdom of Greece. In either case, a number of complex problems would arise and require urgent solutions and it seemed to me indispensable that the Cypriot people should be fully informed of them if they were to be called upon to make their choice. To the best of my knowledge, there is no common understanding on either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-Cypriot side, nor between the Cyprus and Greek Governments, of what form *Enosis* would take and what its effects and implications would be.

142 I have stated the foregoing as matters of fact and of impression. I do not wish it to appear that I have any opinion on the merits or otherwise of *Enosis*. Moreover, I must also make it clear that neither the President nor the Government of Cyprus, in their discussions with me as the Mediator, actually advocated *Enosis* as the final solution of the Cyprus problem. Archbishop Makarios and members of the Government acknowledged that *Enosis* had been the original aim of the uprising against British rule that it remained a strong aspiration among the Greek-Cypriot community. They went so far as to express the opinion that if the choice between independence and *Enosis* were to be put to the people there would probably be a majority in favour of the latter. Some of the Ministers and other high officials of the Government have openly advocated it in public statements; but for the Government as a whole the formal objective is limited to 'unfettered independence', including the right of self-determination. I understood this position, of course, not to preclude the possibility of *Enosis* which would obviously be implicit in the right of the people of Cyprus, once 'fully independent', to choose whatever future course they wished.

143 It is far from me, in any event, to dispute the principle that the people of an independent country possess the right to determine their own future, including their relationship with any other State. This right follows naturally from the fact of sovereign independence. If Cyprus should become 'fully independent' by being freed from the 1960 treaty limitations, it would automatically acquire at the same time the right of self-determination; and if it were an independent State based on democratic principles, it would be entitled to insist that the right should be exercised by the people as a whole, acting directly by such means as a referendum or indirectly through their Government.

144 This brings me to what I regard as the most crucial aspect of the question of *Enosis*. What are the considerations by which a modern sovereign State exercises its right

of self-determination? I suggest that just as the enjoyment by the citizen of his fundamental rights is not an absolute matter but is governed by consideration for the rights and legitimate interests of his fellow-citizens, so also is the exercise by the State of its right of self-determination governed by its obligations as a State. These obligations relate both to the well-being of all its citizens and, especially in the case of a State which has undertaken the solemn commitments laid down in the United Nations Charter, they relate also to the cause of international peace and security.

145. I believe that the Government of Cyprus, which has professed its desire for a peaceful solution to its country's problems, can be expected to follow this general rule. I am confident that in informing, influencing and responding to public opinion on the future status of the country, the Government will recognize that it has a most serious duty to satisfy itself that all of its obligations are being met, towards both the well-being of its own citizens and the peace and security of the region which it shares with other nations. It will wish to be satisfied that any action which it may take, in the name of the right of self-determination, will help to heal rather than jeopardize international peace and security.

146. I must state here in all frankness how myself see the *Enosis* question in the light of the above considerations. My observations of the situation in Cyprus over a period of many months, my discussions with many of its citizens, and my consultations with representatives of all the parties concerned have made it difficult for me to see how any proposed settlement which leaves open the possibility of *Enosis* being brought about against the will of the Turkish-Cypriot minority can secure agreement at present or in the foreseeable future. Serious warnings have been given that an attempt to impose such a solution would be likely to precipitate not only a new outbreak of violence on Cyprus itself but also a grave deterioration in relations between Turkey on the one hand and Cyprus and Greece on the other, possibly provoking actual hostilities and in any case jeopardizing the peace of the eastern Mediterranean region. The question can be raised, consequently, whether it would not be an act of enlightened statesmanship – as well as a sovereign act of self-determination in the highest sense – if the Government of Cyprus were in the superior interests of the security of the State and the peace of the region to undertake to maintain the independence of the Republic. This would imply, of course, a decision on the part of the Government to refrain, for as long as the same risks persisted, from placing before the population the opportunity to opt for *Enosis*. Should the Government of Cyprus undertake such a course of action, I am confident that the Government of Greece, in the same spirit, would be prepared to respect it. I must emphasize again that in view of the sovereign prerogatives which the Cyprus Government would enjoy, this decision would naturally take the form of a voluntary act on its part. To maintain the independence of Cyprus would have to be a free undertaking on the part of the Government and people of Cyprus and not a condition to be imposed upon them. It would remain open to the Government, if it wished the population as a whole to share directly in this exercise of the right of self-determination, to seek through some such means as a referendum its approval of the proposed terms of settlement including the undertaking to maintain the independence of Cyprus. I should like to emphasize here my view that the whole of any proposed settlement based on continued independence, and not the question of independence alone, should in that case be put to the people. My reasons for this will become obvious from the rest of my report. At this point, I need only add that I am

to the people and to gain the understanding and acceptance of the majority. It would also be open to the Government, if it wished to use this further means of encouraging the whole population to vote freely, to invite the United Nations to observe the referendum.

147. Assuming a course of action such as I have described, the common objective would now be considerably more precise: a 'fully independent' state which would undertake to remain independent and to refrain from any action leading to union with any other State. I should regard this clarification as not only satisfying the principle of self-determination but also as going a long way towards meeting another essential requirement of a settlement: namely, that it should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. I should mention here another useful action in that direction which the Government of Cyprus has already indicated: its willingness to take the President, Archbishop Makarios, has declared his readiness to bring about the demilitarization of Cyprus, as a contribution to the peace and security of the region. He has reacted favourably to the idea that international assistance, through the United Nations, should be invited for this task. Moreover, he has indicated his desire to see Cyprus refrain from allying itself with any grouping of nations for military purposes. For its part, the Government of Turkey indicated to me which I first raised this question with last November, that the demilitarization of an independent Cyprus, but only if effectively carried out, and only within the context of a settlement which guaranteed the independence of Cyprus, would serve the interest of Turkey's considerations of security.

148. The suggested denationalization of Cyprus has inevitably raised the question of the future of the two British sovereign base areas. The position of the United Kingdom Government is that, since those areas lie outside the territory of the Republic, they do not form part of the present dispute. I am encouraged to believe, however, that this question could, if it were to become a vital aspect of the settlement as a whole, be constructively discussed among the parties to the Treaty of Establishment by which the base areas were reserved from the territory of the Republic.

(b) *The structure of the State*

149. The next important point of divergence between the parties concerns the structure of the independent State. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot leadership insists upon a unitary form of government based on the principle of minority rule with protection for the minority. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots envisage a federal system within which there would exist autonomous Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot States, the conditions for whose existence would be created by the geographical separation, which they naturally demand, of the two communities.

150. It is essential to be clear what this proposal implies. To refer to it simply as 'federation' is to oversimplify the matter. What is involved is not merely to establish a federal form of government but also to secure the geographical separations of the two communities. The establishment of a federal regime requires a territorial basis, and this basis does not exist. In an earlier part of this report, I explained the island wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot populations. The events since December 1963 have not basically altered this characteristic, even the enclaves where numbers of Turkish Cypriots concentrated following the troubles are widely scattered over the island, while thousands of other Turkish Cypriots have remained in mixed villages.

151 The reason why the Turkish-Cypriot leadership sees a geographical separation, which does not now exist, of the two communities should also be understood. If the fear of *enmity* being imposed upon them is the major obstacle to a settlement as seen from the Turkish-Cypriot side, one reason for it is then the projected threat of Greek rule. Their leaders claim also, however, that even within the context of an independent Cypriot State, events have proved that the two communities, intermingled as they are now, cannot live peacefully together. They would meet this problem by the drastic means of shifting parts of both communities in order to create two distinct geographical regions, one predominantly of Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants and the other of Greek-Cypriots. They claim that this would now be merely an extension of the process that has been forced on them by events: the greatest concentration than usual of them people in certain parts of the island, notably around Nicosia and in the north-west.

152 But the opposition of the Greek-Cypriots to this idea of geographical separation is hardly less strong than the opposition of the Turkish-Cypriots to the imposition of *Enosis*, and I have felt bound to examine the proposal with as much care as in the case of *Enosis*. Much has been written and argued on both sides in Cyprus about the economic and social feasibility (or lack of it) of bringing about through the movement of the populations concerned the only possible basis for a federal state. I have studied these arguments and I find it difficult to see how the practical objections to the proposal can be overcome.

153 In the first place, the separation of the communities is utterly unacceptable to the majority community of Cyprus and on present indications could not be imposed except by force. The opposition to it is in part political. Greek-Cypriots see in the proposal a first step towards the partitioning of the island, although this is vigorously denied by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as well as by the Turkish Government. But to my mind the objections raised also on economic, social and moral grounds are in themselves serious obstacles to the proposition. It would seem to require a compulsory movement of the people concerned—many thousands on both sides—contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time, including those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, this would be a compulsory movement of a kind that would seem likely to impose severe hardship on the families involved as it would be impossible for all of them, or perhaps even the majority of them, to obtain an exchange of land or occupation suited to their needs or experience. It would entail also an economic and social disruption which could be such as to render neither part of the country viable. Such a state of affairs would constitute a lasting, if not permanent, cause of discontent and unrest.

154 Moreover, the proposed federated States would be separated by an artificial line cutting through interdependent parts of homogeneous areas including according to the Turkish-Cypriot proposals, the cities of Nicosia and Famagusta. Would not such a line of division inevitably create many administrative difficulties and constitute a constant cause of friction between two mutually suspicious populations? In fact, the arguments for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government have not convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to partition and thus risk creating a new national frontier between Greece and Turkey, a frontier of a highly provocative nature, through highly volatile peoples who would not hesitate to allow their local differences to risk involving the two home countries in conflict and consequently endangering international peace and security.

155 Again, if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the State, and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish-Cypriot leadership claims in the 'impossibility' of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots learning to live together again in peace. In those parts of the country where movement controls have been relaxed and tensions reduced, they are already proving otherwise.

156 It is essential, I think, to reconsider the objective intended to be served by the geographical separation of the two communities and to look for other ways to achieve that objective. I am inclined to regard separation not as, in itself, a basic principle in the proposals of the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, but rather as the only means which they consider workable of ensuring respect for the real principle at stake: namely, that the Turkish-Cypriot community must be protected and protected adequately. I fully support that principle. I feel strongly that the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot community is one of the most important aspects of the Cyprus problem and that everything possible must be done to ensure it, including safeguards of an exceptional kind. But I would think it essential for the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to reconsider their contention that nothing short of the geographical separation of the two communities can ensure adequate protection.

157 I have found agreement on all sides that there must be practicable and effective safeguards for the security and the rights of all the citizens of Cyprus, as well as the legitimate rights of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community. To be practicable, it is difficult to see how they can take the drastic form of geographical separation of the communities. To be effective, as well as practicable, they could conceivably include certain special measures of a different kind, as discussed below.

(c) *The protection of individual and minority rights*

158 One of the principles of the Charter which I regard as having the highest relevance to any settlement of the Cyprus problem is that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, without discrimination. The fact that the population of the island continues to consist of two principal ethnic communities, the further fact that they are unequal in numbers and finally the gravity of the conflict which has developed between them—all these elements have given and must continue to give rise to serious difficulties in applying this principle, and must be made the subject of special attention.

159 From the moment a settlement is in sight, the Charter's insistence on respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, will assume a capital importance in Cyprus. It will be an indispensable condition for the progressive rebirth of confidence and the re-establishment of social peace. The obstacles against the full application of the principle cannot be overestimated; and they are no less psychological than political. The violent sharpening of 'national' sentiments over the months of crisis will for some time make it extremely difficult for officials at all levels to impose or even exercise strict impartiality and understanding towards all the citizens of the country, and without that impartiality and understanding there will be a constant risk of acts of discrimination, even if laws are respected in the formal sense. Furthermore, there are personal hatreds which will last

beyond any political settlement. Again, not all of the too many weapons which are in too many hands are likely to be surrendered readily. These factors will, for a period whose duration can only be guessed at, create problems of personal security on a serious scale.

160 For all these reasons there is no doubt in my mind - and on this point all parties are in agreement - that there must be established in Cyprus the most rigorous possible guarantees of human rights and safeguards against discrimination. For some time, in order to help the two communities to find their way out of the vicious circle of deep distrust between them, I am convinced, indeed, that certain international guarantees must be provided.

161 It is hardly necessary for me to say that while the safeguards would apply to all the people of both communities, in practice it is the Turkish-Cypriot minority which will stand *most in need of them*. The safeguards are justified not only by the need to establish a durable peace in the life of the island, not only by the need to ensure that the settlement accords with the Charter of the United Nations. Simple equity also demands that these safeguards should be provided. It will need not to be forgotten that the Turkish-Cypriot community obtained from the Zürich and London Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future. In addition, it would be *just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any Turkish-Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life.* Appropriate assistance should also be provided, without discrimination, to rehabilitate all those whose property has been destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the disorders. This will be a task of reconstruction for which, I am confident, external assistance, including that of the United Nations family of organizations, would be forthcoming at the Government's request.

162 I must point out also that the fact that the population of Cyprus consists, even without geographical separation, of two main communities gives rise to another special problem in regard to the application of the United Nations principles of human rights. Each of the two communities is profoundly attached to the 'national' traditions which were bequeathed to it by history, and each has always enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in what it has regarded as the essential fields of religion, education and personal status. In the light of widespread modern conceptions of the need for the integration and assimilation of differing peoples in the interests of national unity, it may be a matter for regret that little was done under any of the previous regimes, ancient or recent, to bridge the separateness of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Recent events have, however, made these disjunctions more rather than less acute, and to try to eliminate them now by 'tristic' measures could only mean taking a distinctly backward step in the field of the protection of human rights as far as the minority community - being in the minority not concerned. Since independence the Greek-Cypriot community - being in the minority not only in terms of numbers but also in the governing institutions of the State - has been in a position to deal freely with its own affairs of religion, education and personal status within the framework of the State: should it have the same powers in respect of the Turkish-Cypriot community, the latter would feel itself deprived of some of the most fundamental of human rights.

163 I have shown earlier in this report that the 1960 Constitution went to unusual lengths in trying to meet this situation by conferring on the Turkish-Cypriot community, as such, a number of political rights designed to allow it to protect itself from being completely subjugated by the majority community. It is, however, this feature of the constitutional system which has been most severely criticized and which has given rise to the most serious difficulties of implementation. It seems impossible to obtain agreement on maintaining such a constitutional authority in the future against the will of the majority. Yet the problem behind it cannot be ignored, and that problem - the hard fact of the distinctive character of the two communities, sharpened by the recent events - requires that some special measures should be applied in order to ensure to the members of the minority community a proper voice in their traditionally communal affairs and also, without weakening the unity of the State, an equitable part in the public life of the country as a whole. Such measures will be a necessary condition for any settlement that must take account, as the Security Council's resolution requires, of the 'well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole'. They need only be transitional: indeed they should be clearly understood by all sides to be so, but they seem to me in fact the only practical way to ensure in the longer run, the political unity of the country. Failure to provide a transitional means of ensuring a share by the Turkish-Cypriot community in the political life of the State could only, I am convinced, have the opposite effect from accelerating their integration. It would only perpetuate their separateness, because it is in the general nature of things that the larger community tends to dominate and that the smaller to be dominated, and it is in the present nature of things in Cyprus that this could prolong the ferment of hostility between them and the risk of endless acts of violence. I cannot emphasize this matter too strongly. It is not a question of denying the right of a political majority to rule, but a question of the need to avoid the excessive dominance of one presently distinct community over another, to an extent and in a manner likely to delay indefinitely the unity of the population.

164 I have therefore been pleased to be able to record the assurances which Archbishop Makarios has given of his concern for these aspects of the problem and the specific measures which he has expressed his willingness to apply. As regards individual rights, these measures include, on the one hand, a number of permanent provisions: the incorporation in the Constitution of human rights and fundamental freedoms conforming with those set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations; judicial procedures for their application, and vigilance to ensure equal treatment in appointments and promotions in the public services. They include, on the other hand, certain exceptional and transitional provisions: of forcible importation among these, in my opinion, an invitation to the United Nations to appoint a commissioner, with a staff of observers and advisers, to be present in Cyprus for as long as necessary, and also the granting of a general amnesty and proviso for the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriots who wished to leave the island and for the rehabilitation of those who would remain. The need for such measures having been conceded in principle, I feel confident that their implementation and extension are, if need be, matters susceptible of negotiation between the parties. I attach particular importance to the presence and role of a United Nations commissioner, a unique and extraordinary safeguard whose very existence would, I believe, engender confidence in all Cypriots.

165 In regard to the second aspect the matter of the position of the Turkish Cypriots as a community I have been pleased also to find some measure of sympathetic understanding in the attitude of the President. He has already offered them a continuation of their previous autonomy in certain fields of religion, education and personal status. Moreover, he conceded to me the desirability of finding some means, for a transitional period at least, of ensuring the representation of the Turkish Cypriots in the governmental institutions. This might be done by a system of proportional representation or reservation of seats in the parliament, and also, perhaps by the appointment of a Turkish Cypriot Minister responsible for the affairs of his community without prejudice, of course, to other Turkish Cypriots being elected or appointed on merit. In this field, too, I am therefore confident that a negotiation between the parties could be fruitful. Another question that will need to be examined and agreed between them is that of the official languages of the State, for use in the administration, the courts and other institutions. It may be that besides Greek and Turkish it will be necessary to give English the transitional status of an official language to serve as a bridge between the other two. The control and staffing of the police force is another matter for careful and sympathetic study. So also is the possibility that municipal and other forms of local government could be so organized as to give the greatest possible measure of local autonomy so that in areas where one community or the other predominates it would feel that it is playing an effective and equitable part in the management of local affairs.

D The question of guarantees

166 In any progress made towards a settlement the question of the means of guaranteeing its provisions will inevitably arise. It would, of course, be open to the parties to embody the terms of the settlement in treaty arrangements, but my impression is that, for very different reasons, both sides to the dispute would approach such a course with misgivings.

167 On the one hand, the conception of treaty arrangements which would affect the internal affairs of the Republic is anathema to many Greek Cypriots. It conjures up the restrictions and impositions which they claim to have suffered by reason of the Treaties of 1960. Even if – and this is essential – the terms of the new settlement are in every respect freely and consciously agreed to by the people of Cyprus, it is conceivable that the old stigma would remain. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots feel also that they have had a painful experience in placing excessive faith in treaties, having seen many of their treaty rights forcibly suspended and the Guarantor Powers fail to act in the crisis as the Turkish Cypriots expected them to.

168 It may be that a different form of guarantee will have to be devised. In this regard I see an opportunity for the United Nations to play an invaluable role, if it so agrees. The possibility could be explored, I believe, of the United Nations itself acting as the guarantor of the terms of the settlement. It might prove feasible, for example, for the parties to agree to lay before the United Nations the precise terms of the settlement and ask it not only to take note of them but also to spell them out in a resolution, formally accepts them as the agreed basis of the settlement, and request that any complaint of violation or difficulty in implementation be brought immediately before it. Such a role for the United Nations would, I believe, be in full accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

Appendix 10

E. Concluding remarks

169 For the reasons stated at the beginning of this chapter I have not felt it appropriate at this stage to set forth precise recommendations or even suggestions of a formal kind for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. I have tried instead, by analysing the positions of the parties and defining their objectives as I see them, to make apparent certain directions which they themselves should explore in the search for a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement. I have done so because it became clear to me that the purpose of mediation could not be further served by my continuing to hold separate consultations with the parties under the existing circumstances.

170 If I have any formal recommendation to make, it is that the parties concerned should try, in the light of the observations I have made in this report, to see them way clear to meet together – with or without presence, according to their wishes – at a suitable place on the earliest possible occasion. In my view the procedure most likely to produce fruitful results would be for such a meeting or series of meetings to take place in the first instance between representatives of the two principal parties who belong to Cyprus: the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. I have explained earlier (see paras 126 and 127) my reasons for holding this view. However, my suggestion by no means precludes other alternatives that may prove acceptable – whether initial meetings between all of the parties concerned, or a series of meetings, consecutive or even simultaneous, at different levels and among different groups of the parties. Moreover, it, as I believe, the most useful beginning can be made at the level of the Cyprus communities, this does not alter the fact that, as I have stated earlier, an 'agreed settlement' in the context of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 must have the adherence of all the parties mentioned in the resolution. Any agreement arrived at between the Cyprus communities would therefore require endorsement by the other parties concerned.

171 I do not suggest a formal agenda for these meetings, nor do I expect that at present it would be feasible for the parties concerned to provide one. They may be agreeable, in the first instance, simply to take the observations in my present report as the basis for an exchange of views – all the more so should they agree to accept the report, as I intend it, as a document for which I alone am responsible.

172 Should this procedure lead the way eventually to an agreement on all major issues at the leadership and governmental level, and should it then be found necessary to refer the terms of settlement to the people of Cyprus directly, I consider that it should be essential to put to the people the basic settlement as a whole. They should be asked to accept or reject it as a single package, and not in its various parts. This is because any settlement which might be arrived at will necessarily be in the nature of a compromise involving concessions to be made by both sides from their original positions. It seems to me inevitable that it will have to be a carefully balanced series of agreements, each relying on the other and all of them on the whole. It will also be accepted, I believe, that should there be a majority vote against the terms of the settlement, this should not be construed as a vote in favour of any other particular solution. Instead, it would only signify that the process of seeking an acceptable form of settlement would have to begin anew.

173 I reiterate and emphasize my conviction that every endeavour must continue to be made to bring about a peaceful solution and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. By any and all appropriate means, the search must go on, with patience, tolerance and good faith. The well-being of the Cypriot people demands it, so does the cause of international peace and security.